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Innovation in the Law of
Warranty: The Burden of Reform
By Timothy J. Sullivan*

I feel apologetic about coming before you with such commonplaces. But . . . we must look at the present with some dismay.
And one reason for this dismay is that I should find it necessary
to remind you of such common places. 1

The adoption of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act2 marked
an important change in the law of warranty in sales transactions.
The justification for this federal intervention in a field previously
viewed as principally a matter of state concern was twofold. First,
Congress assumed that the consumer, as distinguished from the
commercial buyer, needed special protection in the modern marketplace. Second, Congress believed that existing state law, both
statutory and judicial, inadequately protected the average
consumer. 3
This Article proposes to examine the asserted need for federal
legislation to remedy deficiencies in state warranty law. A secondary purpose is to analyze the evolution of quality terms in contract law. To achieve these ends the Article is divided into five
parts: (1) an analysis of the evolution of warranty law in England
and the United States to approximately the beginning of this century; (2) a review of 20th century judicial perceptions of consumer
vulnerability; (3) an analysis of state statutory law (Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code) prior to adoption of the Magnuson* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. A.B.,
1966, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1969, Harvard University. I am grateful for the
encouragement of my colleagues, Professors Ingrid Hillinger, Doug Rendleman, Frederick
Schauer, and Richard Williamson. Thanks are also extended to my research assistant Mr.
Howard Hill. Finally I owe a profound debt to my wife, Anne, whose patience with things
legal is greater than I deserve.
1. P. GAY, Law, Order, and Enlightenment, in Is LAw DEAD? 31 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
2. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
3. See notes 278-307 & accompanying text infra.
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Moss Warranty Act; (4) a brief examination of the legislative ·background to and substantive content of the Magnuson-Moss Act itself; and (5) some concluding observations.
This Article has chosen an historical approach to warranty law
for two reasons. First, to assay the need for federal warranty legislation, a careful study of the prior law adjudged to be deficient is
necessary. Second, recent literature on the consumer and quality
terms neglects the importance of history in understanding the present state of warranty law;' The law of warranty is complicated
and not always consistent with what seems to be logical. Although
historical analysis will not eliminate that illogic, it identifies the
source of much of the present confusion.

The Quality Term In Legal History
Few areas of the law have historical origins more complex than
the law of warranty. A mastery of ancient doctrine is a substantial
aid in the comprehension of seeming anomalies in the modern law.15
Indeed, the confused state of current warranty law is in part the
result of the persistent insensitivity of many courts and lawyers to
the relevance of historical context.6 Resort to history is thus justified for the most practical of reasons.
Consider this example: A farmer contracts to buy a tractor.
4. See, e.g., Pauly, Consumerism Takes It on the Chin: Warranty Disclaimers in
Oklahoma, 10 TuLsA L.J. 675 (1975); Weintraub, Disclaimers of Warranties and Limitation
of Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEx. L. REv. 60 (1974); West,
Disclaimers of Warranties-Its Curse and (Possible) Cure, 76 CoM. L.J. 253 (1971); Comment, Uniform Commercial Code: Disclaimer of Implied Warranties from a Manufacturer's Perspective, 80 DicK. L. REv. 566 (1976); Comment, SGles: New Tests for "Goods"
and Disclaimers of Implied Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. FLA.
L. REv. 796 (1971); Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 VA. L. REv. 791 (1977); Note, Restricting Disclaimer of the Warranty of Merchantability in Consumer Sales: Proposed Alternatives to the UCC, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 895 (1971); Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 30 (1978).
5. Professor Llewellyn lamented the absence of historical analysis in sales cases and
commentary: "It is a sad commentary on our dogmatics that sales cases over a hundred and
fifty years and more than fifty jurisdictions have been treated as if they floated free of time,
place and person." Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM. L. REv. 699,
699 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn].
6. The commentators have differed as to the reasons for the complexity of warranty
law. One observer has noted that these difficulties may be traced to three causes: (1) too
much theory; (2) too little theory; (3) no theory whatever. Stoljar, Conditions, Warranties
and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods, 15 Mon. L. REv. 425 (1952).
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As agreed, the farm implement dealer delivers a tractor, ostensibly

to satisfy the farmer's need. Although the machine delivered is a
tractor, it lacks the power to pull the attachments required for effective farming. Has the farmer legal cause for complaint? The
facts are much simplified and make a forthright answer difficult.
Most attorneys will agree, however, that the farmer's best hope for
relief may lie not in the main body of contract law,7 but rather in
the law of warranty. To the farmer it is a matter of common sense:
If the tractor will not do what tractors are supposed to do, relief
should be available. In the end, the law may countenance that result. The careful lawyer, however, must tell the farmer client that
common sense in the law of warranty is not always as simple as it
seems.

England
Origins of Substantive Warranty Law
Had the farmer lived in medieval England and dealt in horses
rather than tractors, he or she might have found the rule of law
more congenial, or at least more forthright. In the English society
of the 13th and 14th centuries,8 the influence of the Church was
pervasive. The sum of human activity was linked to its relationship
with God; trade for profit was considered sinful. Religious duty required sellers to correct quality defects unknown to them at the
time of sale.9 Other institutions such as feudal authority and craft
guilds reinforced the Church's teaching by imposing upon sellers
rigorous quality standards in conducting their trade. 10
7. Many courts have not treated noncompliance with a warranty obligation as just
another breach of contract. Historically, warranty breaches were considered a special kind of
legal problem; particular rules, not always consistent with basic contract law, have been
devised to deal with warranty problems. The Uniform Commercial Code attempts to integrate the remedial aspects of warranty law with the main body of sales doctrine. See generally Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262,
278-79 (1964); Rabel, The Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 TUI.. L. REv. 273, 273-74
(1950). For a formal discussion of the reasons for the special treatment of warranty law
outside the main body of contract law, see text accompanying notes 57-94 infra.
8. Implied warranties of quality may be traced to even earlier periods. Early Welsh
codes contained provisions implying warranties of title and warranties against any "inward
disorder" in the goods. Stone, The Transaction of Sale in Saxon Times, 29 LAw Q. REv.
323, 334 (1913).
9. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1137-38 (1931)

[hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
10. ld. at 1153-54.
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Slowly, a professional class of traders emerged. As early as the
12th century, special courts were established to adjust relations
among traders and between traders and their custoniers.11 By the
13th and 14th centuries, these special courts had acquired an institutional character and were convened regularly at trade fairs, and
later, in market towns. From the decisions of these courts emerged
the beginnings of the "law merchant." What records of· their proceedings as have survived suggest that they consistently imposed
strict responsibility upon sellers for the quality of their wares.12
Thus, from its infancy the law merchant, insofar as it dealt with
the quality of goods, was founded on "credit, not distrust."13
A variety of local courts of sometimes inconsistent and overlapping jurisdiction also existed at this time. In these local courts
the fraudulent seller was called to account. The plaintiff buyer's
action was sometimes labeled covenant but more often trespass or
deceit. These local courts also imposed sanctions against sellers for
defects in the quality of their goods. The seller who delivered defective goods not only harmed the buyer, but also violated local
criminal law. The seller's wrong thus transcended the limits of the
particular transaction and offended the community's sensibilities
·
as well.14
With the decline of feudal institutions, the break with Rome,
and the rise of an influential middle class tied to trade @d commerce, the ordered world of medieval England, linked closely to
Christian teaching in all its aspects, was in decline.115 The legal
fields in which the concept of caveat emptor would later flourish
came under cultivation.
Most commentators trace the origins of the doctrine of caveat
emptor to Chandelor v. Lopus. 16 In Chandelor, the plaintiff purchased what the defendant seller falsely affirmed was a bezoar
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1159-62.
T. ScaUTl'oN, THE ELEMENTS OF MERcANTILE LAw 23 (1891).
S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 276 (1969) (hereinafter

cited as Mn.soM].
15. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1164-70.
16. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1603). The commentators have not all agreed that caveat
emptor made its first appearance in Chandelor. Professor Simpson, for example, traces the
substance of the doctrine back to Harvey v. Young decided a year before Chandelor but not
reported. A. SIMPSON, A HisTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 536 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as SIMPSON].
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stone. 17 The buyer sued successfully in the King's Bench. The verdict was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber on the grounds that
the plaintiff had proved neither that the defendant knew his affirmation. to be false nor that he had warranted the stone to be a
bezoar stone. The court noted that all sellers will affirm that their
wares are good; only if the sellers warranted the quality of their
goods, however, would a cause of action lie. 18
This restrictive reading in Chandelor of the seller's obligation
for quality had little impact for the rest of the 17th century. The
reports of the period contain few cases in which the issue of responsibility for defective goods was litigated.19 Nonetheless, efforts
persisted to establish caveat emptor as a ruling precedent. The
doctrine was advanced by the emergent philosophy of individualism and by the doctrine of laissez-faire, both of which were antithetical to the interventionist impulses and regulatory standards so
characteristic of the medieval period.20
The 18th century was a battleground between the rigorous
quality standards imposed on sellers by the law merchant and the
developing concept of caveat emptor. In some cases the disappointed buyer was given protection.21 In others, the doctrine of caveat emptor was invoked implicitly, if not explicitly by the seller.22
By the closing decades of the century the struggle over the status
of caveat emptor was further complicated because the fluidity of
17. A bezoar stone is a gallstone-like object found in the intestines of goats. At the
time Chandelor was decided, bezoar stones were considered to have a variety of salutary
medicinal qualities. SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 536.
18. Professor McMurtrie contends that the plaintiff in Chandelor lost because of a
defect in his declaration, not on any substantive grounds. McMurtrie, Chandelor v. Lopus, 1
HARv. L. REv. 191 (1887). Professor Ames, on the other hand, contends that the result did
not turn on a point of pleading. Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pt. 1), 2 HARv. L. REv. 1,
9-10 (1888) [hereinafter cited as Ames]. Professor Hamilton believes that there was a second
action between the parties involving the same facts, the results of which were reported in
Southern v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 400 (K.B. 1618). Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1166-67. Professor Simpson rejects the notion that there were two actions. SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 536

n.2.
19. There were some actions in which the courts did treat the problem of seller's responsibility for quality. These cases had no factual similarity; however, they often concerned
transactions far removed from the everyday buying and selling of chattels. See, e.g., Ekins v.
Tresham, 83 Eng. Rep. 318 (K.B. 1663); Tracy v. Veal, 79 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1608); Roswel
v. Vaughan, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (EL 1606).
20. Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law (pt. 1) 74
YALE L.J. 262, 266 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
22. See, e.g., Jendwine v. Slade, 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (K.B. 1797).
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mercantile custom was not easily assimilated into the formalism of
the common law.28
The 19th century was marked, for a time, by the clear ascendancy of caveat emptor.24 Many cases may be cited in which the
doctrine was invoked to cut back the seller's liability for quality. 211
For example, In Chanter v. Hopkins 26 the defendant buyer operated a brewery. He ordered from the plaintiff seller a patented furnace which the seller had advertised as a "Smoke-consuming Furnace." Mter installation, the defendant complained that there was
as much smoke as before and that brewing took more time than
before installation. The defendant refused to pay and the plaintiff
brought suit. The defendant did not assert or attempt to prove
fraud, but based his defense on the broad principle: "If a man sells
an article, he thereby warrants that it is merchantable-that it is
fit for some purpose."21 The court, in affirming the verdict for the
plaintiff, rejected the defendant's "broad principle":
What is the [buyer's] order? It is an order for one of those engines of which the plaintiff was known to be the patentee; he was
not obliged to know the object or use to which the defendant
meant to apply it; and it is admitted there is no fraud. . . . It
appears to me that this is the ordinary case of a man who has the
misfortune to order a particular chattel, on the supposition that it
will answer a particular purpose, but who finds it will not. I think
there is no ground at all, therefore, to disturb the verdict.28

Even after the general acceptance of caveat emptor, there were
two means by which the buyer could impose liability on the seller
for defective goods. First, the seller was still accountable for express representations known to be false. Second, if the seller ex23. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1172.
24. The evolution of legal doctrine is rarely tidy. The rigid requirement that the writer
compress unruly history into neat paragraphs sometimes leads to oversimplification. In retrospect, it appears that by the beginning of the 19th century caveat emptor was an emerging
doctrine, although some cases support a different conclusion. The problem was further complicated because well into the middle of the 19th century each branch of the English judicial
system-King's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas-was rendering decisions inconsistent with decisions on similar facts by the other two branches. "It is amazing to think that
any lawyer could have thought all three were announcing and applying a single body of
law." Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 720.
25. See, e.g., Burnby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1847); Parkinson v. Lee, 102
Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802).
26. 150 Eng. Rep. 1484 (Ex. 1838).
27. Id. at 1486.
28. Id. at 1487.
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pressly warranted the goods, the seller would be strictly liable for
any defect inconsistent with the warranty. 29
An express warranty was a matter of some ·formality; mere affirmations or general expressions of quality would not suffice.80 Because of the general acceptance of caveat emptor the buyer could
gain protection only by insisting upon a separate or special warranty of quality. This had the effect of separating warranty law
from the developing rules of bargain and sale. 81
Concurrent with the general ascendancy of caveat emptor were
counterpressures to expand the seller's responsibility for quality.
These contradictory tendencies created a period of impasse. On the
one hand, the early common law judges readily found the seller
liable for fraud or breach of express warranty, however narrowly
defined. On the other hand, caveat emptor was invoked to protect
against extending the seller's liability beyond fraud or breach of
warranty, in the limited sense then accepted.82 The impasse could
not and would not be long lived. The tendency of the common law
over time has been to broaden the scope of the seller's responsibility for quality. 88
In retrospect, the inadequacy of early English warranty law
appears to be based on an overly narrow definition of fraud. 84
There could be liability for fraudulent misstatemen~ only if a
seller's statements were knowingly false. Absent technical words of
express warranty, there was no liability for negligent or careless
misrepresentations. This meant that "t~e ingenious rascal went
free." 311 However, the potential for expanding the liability of sellers
for the quality of their goods was imminent in the doctrine of express warranty because the sellers who expressly warranted their
goods were held strictly liable for any breach.86 Thus, from an
29. 8 W. HoLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 69-70 (1926} [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTH].
30. The reports are not precise about what formalities were required to create an express warranty. See SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 245.
31. Stoljar, Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods, 15
Moo. L. REV. 425, 431-32 (1952}.
32. 1 T. STREET, THE FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 378-79 (1906} [hereinafter cited
as STREET].
33. Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under the Modern Sales Law (pt. 1}, 74
YALE L.J. 262, 263-64 (1964}.
34. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 69.
35. STREET, supra note 32, at 380.
36. See note 29 supra.
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early date, the notion of liability without fraud or guilty knowledge
had already been incorporated into the law in a limited sense by
the recognition of express warranty.87
Lord Holt began the process of expanding the seller's liability
for quality by striking directly at two of the principles that had
served to restrain the expansion of seller's liability: (1) the requirement that special words be used to raise a warranty and (2)
the standard that no liability would attach to false statements
made in connection with the sale of goods unless the seller knew of
their falsity. In two decisions,88 Lord Holt held that an express
warranty could be found even though no special words of warranty
were used: "[T]he bare affirming it to be his amounts to
warranty. " 89
Lord Holt's decisions did more than merely weaken existing
requirements that technical words be used to create a warranty or
that actual knowledge of false representations be established
before liability for fraud would attach. In a sense, his work anticipated the concept of implied warranty. Prior to Lord Holt's decisions, words of art were necessary to establish any warranty; the
impact of his reasoning was that warranty could be implied from
words which an ordinary person would assume amounted to a representation of good title.40 This contribution freed the development of warranty law from the formalism that had retarded its
expansion.
The development of impJ,ied warranties into a form resembling
modem implied warranties took little more than fifty years.41 In
37. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 70.
38. Medina v. Stoughton, 91 Eng. Rep. 188 (K.B. 1700); Cross v. Gardner, 89 Eng.
Rep. 453 (K.B. 1689).
39. Medina v. Stoughton, 91 Eng. Rep. 188, 188 (K.B. 1700).
40. Not all scholars are of the opinion that Lord Holt's warranty of title decisions
notably advanced warranty law. See, e.g., STREET, supra note 32, at 383-84; Williston, What
Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law of Sales, 21 HARv. L. REv. 555, 556 (1908).
Lord Holt's innovative impulse was exercised in the area of title to chattels. Presumably,
legal minds of that era, steeped in the centrality of property in the legal system, could more
easily countenance advances that seemed to protect expectations of title as distinguished
from the qualitative aspect of goods.
41. Implied warranties in the sale of food and drink had been recognized in England
since the Middle Ages. The source of such implied warranties apparently rested in statutory
enactments of some kind, because a breach was an offense against the commonwealth. See
Roswel v. Vaughn, 79 Eng. Rep. 171, 172 (Ex. 1608) (Tanfield, C.B.). The entire subject is
fully discussed in Burnby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1847). There is no evidence
that the long tradition of fixing liability for breach of implied warranties on the sellers of
food and drink influenced the later and broader development of the doctrine.
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two decisions, one involving the sale of beer to a tavern keeper42
and the other a contract to deliver "waste silk,"48 Lord Ellenborough'" declared that where the buyer has no opportunity to inspect
the goods, the maxim of caveat emptor does not apply: "Without
any particular warranty [merchantable quality] is an implied term
in every such contract. . . . [The buyer] cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any particular quality or :fineness,
but the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall
be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned in
the contract between them."4 G In neither case was fraud on the
part of the seller alleged or proved. In both cases Lord Ellenborough succeeded in imposing liability on sellers for failure to meet a
quality stru;ldard never specifically warranted. The court's task
thus became one of divining the parties~ presumed but unspoken
intent. Although the court carefully restricted its holding to cases
in which the buyer had no opportunity to inspect the purchased
goods, the foundation was laid for a significant expansion of seller's
liability for quality defects.
Lord Ellenborough's opinions were so brief that they reveal
little of their theoretical foundations. On the other hand, Chief
Justice Best's opinion in Jones v. Bright,46 which built upon Lord
Ellenborough's work, is significant because the dialogue between
counsel and the court provides a striking insight into the great theoretical changes that were then occurring in warranty law. In
Bright, the plaintiff had purchased copper sheathing for his ship
from the defendant manufacturer, who was aware of the purposes
for which the plaintiff wished to use the copper. The defendant
assured the plaintiff, "I will supply you well."47 In fact, the copper
became greatly worn and pocked after only four months use. The
evidence established that ordinary marine copper could be expected to last four years. The plaintiff sued and recovered judgment in the trial court.
-?

42. Holcombe v. Hewson, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B. 1810).
43. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
44. Lord Ellenborough's role as an innovator in warranty law is somewhat curious.
One of his biographers wrote: "[A)II of his tendencies were strongly towards the support of
government, and the resistence of innovations." E. Foss, 8 JUDGES OF ENGLAND 321 (1864).
He was, however, considered to be a learned and able judge, eloquent, inflexibly just, but
possessed of a wit touched too much by sarcasm and ridicule. Id. at 322-23.
45. Gardiner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B.1815).
46. 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
47. Id. at 1167.
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On appeal, the defendant argued that there could be no recovery unless the seller used words of express warranty or knew that
the copper sold was defective.48 They attempted to distinguish
Gardiner v. Gray49 on the grounds that the seller in that case had
been held liable not because of any implied. warranty, but for failure to deliver goods of the description expressly warranted.110 The
seller also argued that economic disaster would attend the approval of this new idea of implied warranty: "If such a doctrine
can be maintained, every dealer or manufacturer,-however skillful
in the exercise of his art; however carefl,ll in the selection of his
materials; and however cautioW? in the language of his contracts,-may be ruined in a moment by the unexpected failure of
his commodity."111
Despite the seller's able counsel, the verdict for the plaintiff
buyer was affirmed on appeal. The court rejected the defendant's
reliance on "old cases." Chandelor, the court said, simply established the proposition that a seller would be liable for breach of
warranty or false representation. It did not hold that the warranty
must be express; an implied warranty was within the Chandelor
holding. One judge declined to quibble about "ancient learning,"
stating that the case should be put on the broad principle that if a
person sells an article, it is thereby warranted to be merchantable.112 Although there was some doubt whether the warranty was
express or implied, the judges were unanimous in their support for
the concept of implied warranties. Finally, they addressed the defendant's economic argument: "[This] case is of great importance;
because it will teach manufacturers that they must not aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior quality, and
that the law will protect purchasers who are necessarily ignorant of
the commodity sold." 118
The parameters of warranty law even as articulated in a document as current as the Uniform Commercial Code have been
largely drawn from the decision in Bright. Although other English
decisions in the first sixty years of the 19th century gave warranty
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

!d. at 1170.
171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815).
130 Eng. Rep. at 1171.
!d. at 1170-71.
!d. at 1172.
!d. at 1173.
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law a more comprehensive character,6 " the three most important
developments were the erosion of the requirement that prescribed
formalities be observed in order to create express warranties; the
development of implied warranties; and the imposition of strict liability for misrepresentations about quality. 66

The Evolution of Liability For Breach of Warranty In a Procedural Context
Suits for breach of warranty were first brought in tort as actions on the case for deceit. 66 During early stages in its evolution,
breach of warranty was considered wholly delictual because the
pleadings rarely asserted the existence of consideration. In the few
cases that did allege consideration, it was dismissed as irrelevant. 67
The principal actions by which the royal courts regulated the
sale of goods were debt and detinue. 68 By the 15th century lawyers
recognized the affinity of certain actions on the case to contractual
matters. 69 Yet the incorporation of warranty actions into the body
of assumpsit was delayed until the close of the 18th century. 60 The
delay is explained by the fact that warranty actions had originated
in local, nonroyal courts which treated breaches of warranty as an
offense against society rather than as a matter concerning only the
interests of private litigants.61 Only gradually, after warranty actions began to be brought in the royal courts, did the impact of
their delictual origin begin to fade. Once this occurred, it became
obvious that false representations of quality could furnish the basis
54. See generally Jones v. Just, L.R., 3 Q.B. 197 (1868); Bridge v. Wain, 171 Eng. Rep.
543 (K.B. 1816); Josling v. Kingsford, 143 Eng. Rep. 177 (C.P. 1863).
55. English warranty law is doctrinally more complex than warranty law in the United
States. This is surprising because the Sale of Goods Act, which has governed warranty law
in England since 1893, was the model for Professor Williston's Uniform Sales Act. The
whole of English warranty law is ably analyzed in Stoljar, Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods, 15 Mon. L. REv. 425 (1952).
56. SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 240. Apparently even to laWYers schooled in the writ
system, the warranty action on the case in deceit posed problems. It was brought in the
ostenturus quare form which had the characteristics of a catchall writ devoid of any organizing principle. Id. at 241.
57. Ames, supra note 18, at 8. Indeed, in the earliest reported action for breach of
warranty in common form, the defendant objected that the action sounded in covenant. The
court rejected his argument. See Mn.soM, supra note 14, at 276-77.
58. SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 242.
59. MILSOM, supra note 14, at 277.
60. 8 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 70.
61. MILsoM, supra note 14, at 276.
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for an action in deceit as well as in assumpsit for broken
promises.62
The reclassification of warranty actions from tort to contract63
after many of the principles of the law of contract had assumed
certain fixed characteristics is of more than antiquarian concern.
Its effects are still felt in the application of modern warranty law.
Had warranties been developed initially as a part of the law of contract, there might never have been a body of warranty rules
outside the mainstream of contract doctrine. The doctrine of consideration, for example, had become well established prior to the
time warranty actions were treated in a contractual context. If the
example of the farmer who purchased a defective tractor were
viewed solely from the perspective of classic contract doctrine, the
exchange of the tractor for the agreed price was supported by adequate consideration within the meaning of technical contract rules.
Only when contract law began to assimilate rules which took account of the quality of the goods delivered could the farmer hope
for relief.« Because the law of warranty was merged into the law of
contract at the time contractual principles had evolved into a welldeveloped body of formal rules,6 G the influence of its own historical
origin in tort were never fully assimilated.
62. The case that most clearly marks the transition of breach of warranty from tort to
contract is Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). The case is also notable for an
uncharacteristically equivocal opinion by Lord Mansfield.
63. Legal categories such as tort and contract are of great importance in rationalizing
modern legal principles. Early common law lawyers, however, were barely cognizant of such
categories. For them, the writ system was what mattered. In the writ system, tort and contract, as the terms are now understood, had no meaning. For convenience, the terms tort
and contract will be used throughout this discussion, although they are of dubious historical
accuracy.
64. Professor McClain contends that the first attempts to enforce implied warranties
were made in deceit actions rather than in actions for breach of warranty. These early efforts were only partially successful because scienter was required in deceit actions. The real
growth of implied warranties did not occur until warranties became a recognized part of the
law of assumpsit. See McClain, Implied Warranties in Sales, 7 HARv. L. REV. 213, 219
(1893). Assumpsit itself developed as a part of the action of trespass on the case as an
alternative to covenant and debt as a means of enforcing promises. See T. PLucKNETT, A
CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw 644-45 (5th ed. 1956). The courts yielded to the need
for this alternative in Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602), which eliminated the
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the promisor made two promises. But see Ames,
supra note 18, at 16. In Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760), Lord Mansfield
allowed a promisee who could not show an express promise of any kind to recover. The
significance of Lord Mansfield's opinion was to allow a recovery founded upon the implication of a promise rather than on an expression of promise.
65. See SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 243.

November 1980]

LAW OF WARRANTY

353

The United States
Express warranties were routinely enforced in the United
States. 66 The recognition of implied warranties, however, was slow
and tortuous. The state of American law at this time was well expressed by William Wetmore Story who wrote: "The general rule
of law, applicable to all sales, is, that the buyer buys at his owh
risk; caveat emptor. " 67 More contemporary scholars, aided by the
perspective of time, agreed that caveat emptor was the dominant
American doctrine for the greater part of the 19th century.68 Yet
the rejection of the concept of implied warranties was not uniform,S9 and even in jurisdictions which purported to adhere faithfully to caveat emptor, there were occasionallapses.70 There can be
no doubt, however, that American courts gave ground grudgingly
to the advance of implied warranties.
Seixas v. Wood 11 is perhaps the earliest American case in
which the doctrine of caveat· emptor was fully discussed and approved. In Seixas the plaintiff had purchased what the defendant
seller specifically described as brazilleto, a commodity of considerable value. Unknown to either party, the wood proved to be not
brazilleto but peachum, having hardly any value. The defendant
contended that there had been no express warranty, only a mere
66. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Berry, 10 lli. {5 Gilm.) 36 (1848); Hillman v. Wilcox, 30 Me.
170 (1849); Kinley v. Fitzpatrick, 5 Miss. (4 Howard) 59 (1839); Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt.
119 (1852).
67. W. STORY, A TREATisE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS NoT UNDER SEAL 329 (1844).
68. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 180 (1977);
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1178.
69. In the 18th century, reported cases in both North and South Carolina rejected the
unfettered application of caveat emptor. In Galdbraith v. Whyte, 2 N.C. {1 Hayw.) 601
(1797), the North Carolina Superior Court stated: "Every man is bound to be honest-he
ought to discover to the vendee all such properties as if known might probably dispose him
not to purchase." See also Timrod v. Shoolbread, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324 (1793). By the 19th
century this resistance to caveat emptor declined in North Carolina but continued in full
force in South Carolina. See Missroon v. Waldo, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 76 (1819); Barnard v. Yates, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 142 (1818). In Barnard, Justice Gantt minced no
words in expressing his hostility to the notion of caveat emptor: "On our part we have
exchanged it [caveat emptor] for that of caveat venditor, and in behalf of honesty and fair
dealing, I would say esto perpetua • • • • I think it has been truly observed, that it is a
disgrace to the law that such a maxim, as that of 'caveat emptor,' should ever have been
adopted." 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 147.
70. In the 19th century, New York was considered a bastion of caveat emptor. But see
Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350 (N.Y. 1840); Gallagher v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20 (N.Y. 1832).
71. 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. 1804).
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representation.72
On the facts presented, Justice Thompson could not find an
express warranty. He then raised, sua sponte, the question of
whether a warranty might be implied. He answered in the negative
and declared the superiority of the principle of caveat emptor. Not
only did he see no injustice in the rule's application, but he believed the rule was "best calculated to excite that caution and attention which all prudent men ought to observe in making their
contracts."73 Justice Kent agreed, resting his conclusion heavily on
English precedent.74
The opinions of both Justices Thompson and Kent are
marked by an attitude that caveat emptor is not a rule that compliments either human nature or the law. Justice Thompson cited
Professor Wooddeson's Vinerian lectures in which caveat emptor
was criticized as retrograde. 7 G Justice Kent noted approvingly the
civil law tradition that imposed a broad responsibility upon sellers
for latent defects. He even suggested that were the matter open, he
would have preferred the civilian view.76 Yet both Justices, in the
end found for the seller based on English precedent and perhaps
also because of their conception of the needs and expectations of
business.
Justices Thompson and Kent thus approved the doctrine of
caveat emptor in a somewhat equivocal fashion in Seixas, which
was decided in 1804. As the century progressed, the rejection of
implied warranties and the approval of caveat emptor was expressed with less uncertainty in most American jurisdictions. Justice Davis, writing for the Supreme Court in the case of Barnard v.
Kellogg, 77 betrayed no doubts about the virtues of caveat emptor:78
72. Id. at 49.
73. Id. at 54.
74. Id. at 54-55.
75. Id. at 52-53.
76. Chancellor Kent remained an uncertain advocate of caveat emptor. Writing thirtysix years after his opinion in Seixas he still regretted that the common law could not adopt
rules of conduct in conformity with higher notions of morality. He believed the rule of caveat emptor to be justified because it imposed upon buyers the reasonable duty to protect
their own interests. 2 J. KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 477-79, 490-91 (4th ed.
1840).
77. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383 (1870).
78. It is ironic that Justice Davis wrote with such unstinting enthusiasm in support of
caveat emptor at a time when, for a variety of reasons, many state courts had begun to
abandon it. SeeM. HoRWITZ, THE TRANsFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 198200 (1977).
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No principle of the common law has been better established, or
more often affirmed, both in this country and in England, than
. . . the maxim of caveat emptor . . . . Such a rule, requiring the
purchaser to take care of his own interests, has been found best
adopted to the wants of trade in the business transactions of life
. . . . Of such universal acceptance is the doctrine of caveat
emptor in this country, that the courts of all the States in the
Union where the common law prevails, with one exception,
(South Carolina), sanction it.79

In Seixas and in Barnard, caveat emptor was defended on the
grounds that precedent, both English and American, justified the
doctrine. However, the courts in both cases decided to sustain caveat emptor for reasons more fundamental than devotion to stare
decisis. Chief Justice Gibson stated that alternatives to caveat
emptor were impractical and that commerce depended upon legal
rules that allowed as few reclamations as possible: "The relation
of buyer and seller . . . is not a confidential one; and if the buyer,
instead of exacting an explicit warranty, chooses to rely on the
bare opinion of one who knows no more about the matter than he
does himself, he has himself to blame for it."80 Justice Richardson,
sharing Chief Justice Gibson's fear of constant judicial interven~ion in commercial dealings, summoned an unhappy vision in
which courts were given "a species ·of eminent domain to model,
make or break contracts."81 Justice Paige believed that caveat
emptor was admirably adopted to the dawning age of manufacturing. He stated the rule "encourages trade by preventing actions
against all in turn through whose hands the article of commerce
has passed in a course of dealings. . . . [To] apply to these persons
the principle of caveat venditor would lead to endless
litigation. . . ." 82
79. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.} at 388·89.
80. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57 (Pa. 1839}. Professor Llewellyn expressed
mild surprise that Chief Justice Gibson, the vigorous advocate of caveat emptor, was a Jacksonian Democrat. See Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 733. Had Professor Llewellyn enjoyed the
full benefit of revisionist historical study of the Jacksonian era, he might not have been as
surprised. In the view of many historians, a principal tenet of the Jacksonian faith was a
belief in economic development and the right of a new class of entrepreneurs to contend
equally with established persons of wealth. See generally R. REMINI, THE REVOLUTIONARY
AGE oF ANDREW JACKSON 9-25 (1976}. See also M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION:
POLITICS AND BELIEF (1957}.
81. Harrington v. Commissioners, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord} 400, 408 (1823}.
82. Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 89 (1851}. It would be simplistic to suggest that the
19th century American cases that rejected the concept of implied warranties were but crude
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The rules developed to sustain the doctrine of caveat emptor
presupposed a classical exchange transaction in which there was
face to face dealing, relatively equal commercial experience on
both sides, and a fair opportunity to examine the goods.83 So long
as these factors existed in a majority of contracts, warranties for
the buyer's benefit were generally unnecessary. By the 19th century, however, the classical commercial world had begun to change.
Mass production and contracts of sale for the future delivery of
standard goods between distant parties became the norm.84 Goods
became more specialized and diverse, and the assumption that
every party to a contract had equal bargaining power could no
longer be made. Transcontinental bargains became routine and the
buyer's presale opportunity to inspect-the foundation of caveat
emptor-was rendered increasingly suspect.815 The law responded
to these changes by a gradual recession of the doctrine of caveat
emptor and expansion of implied quality warranties.86
reflections of an economic bias in favor of the rising manufacturing and commercial class.
See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 341, 348-49
(1937). Professor Horwitz supports Professor Llewellyn's general thesis that changes in commercial life and the growth of a national market economy helped explain the decline of
caveat emptor. Professor Horwitz, however, may not share Professor Llewellyn's view that
no class bias or exploitation was involved. See generally M. HoRwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 173-201 (1977). Professor Horwitz's treatment of the transformation of contract law in the 19th century was subjected to a searching critique in Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 533 (1979). Moreover, in many cases decided in jurisdictions that faithfully invoked the doctrine of caveat
emptor, sensible results were reached. See, e.g., Muller v. Eno, 14 N.Y. 597 (1856); Hargous
v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73 (1851); Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Pa. 149 (1871).
83. The pervasive use of factors in the 19th century may also have had some impact
on the persistance of caveat emptor. Sellers who used factors to select goods that the seller
had contracted to buy generally had no more specific knowledge of the goods than the
buyer. See generally Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 COLUM.
L. REV. 745 (1936).
84. Professor Llewellyn describes market conditions in which caveat emptor flourished
as "primitive mercantile." Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 739. Market conditions that led to the
erosion of caveat emptor he describes as "mature mercantile." Llewellyn, On Warranty ·of
Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 341, 342-45 (1937).
85. In many of the cases which based their holdings on the principle of caveat emptor,
the courts emphasized that the buyer has the right of inspection and thus had the means to
protect himself or herself. See, e.g., Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1870);
Seixas v. Wood, 2 Cai. R. 48, 55 (N.Y. 1804); McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57 (Pa.
1839). Sometimes the right of inspection was of more theoretical than practical benefit to
the buyer. If the goods were in existence and defined at the time of sale, the fact that there
was no opportunity to inspect did not justify the implication of a warranty of merchantability. See Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 88 (1851).
86. See W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL 333 (1844).
Professor Williston, in the second edition of his treatise on sales, noted the tendency of both
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The American law of warranty in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries was stunningly complex. The existence of an implied
warranty could depend upon a considerable array of factors such
as whether the agreement was a sale of present goods or an executory agreement for the sale of future goods,87 whether the seller
was a manufacturer or a mere dealer,88 and whether there was a
sale by sample or by description. 89 These complexities need not be
explained in depth: it is enough to recognize that they provided
fertile soil for the germination of doctrines which encouraged the
expansion of seller's implied obligations for quality. Chief among
the devices used to expand a seller's liability for quality was the
manipulation of numerous exceptions to the general rule of caveat
emptor. 90
Two Massachusetts cases with contrasting results on similar
facts vividly illustrate the process by which the reach of caveat
emptor was restricted. In· Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery, 91 the
express and implied warranties to impose expanded liability upon the seller. S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON SALES 368-72, 440-43 (2d ed. 1924).
87. See Deming v. Foster, 42 N.H. 165 (1860). "In the case of executory contracts •..
the law implies a contract that the articles to be made and furnished shall be reasonably fit
and proper for the use for which they are ordered. • . . But there is no implied warranty as
to the quality of an article sold • . • where there is a present sale of a particular existing
article •••." Id. at 173-74.
88. Where the seller was a manufacturer many courts held that an implied warranty
existed when the buyer had no opportunity to inspect. See National Cotton Oil Co. v.
Young, 74 Ark. 144, 85 S.W. 92 (1905); Glasgow Milling Co. v. Burgher, 122 Mo. App. 14, 97
S.W. 950 (1906); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz, 15 N.D. 477, 107 N.W. 1078 (1906). Where
the seller was a dealer most American courts found no implied warranty. McCaa v. Elam
Drug Co., 114 Ala. 74, 21 So. 479 (1897); Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206, 91 P. 179 (1907);
Heman v. Crook, Homer & Co., 100 Md. 210, 59 A. 753 (1905).
89. A sale by description occurred when the seller's description of the goods was a
fundamental factor inducing the sale. Although the courts were frequently imprecise in their
definition of sales by description, most courts agreed that when a sale by description occurred an implied warranty that the goods conformed to the description arose. See, e.g.,
Munford v. Kevil, 109 Ky. 246, 58 S.W. 703 (1900); Lenz v. Blake-McFall Co., 44 Or. 569, 76
P. 356 (1904). Sales by sample gave rise to an implied warranty that the bulk of the article
sold would be equivalent to the sample. See, e.g., Worcester Mfg. Co. v. Waterbury Brass
Co., 73 Conn. 554, 48 A. 422 (1901); Dayton v. Hooglund, 39 Ohio St. 671 (1884); Hume v.
Sherman Oil & Cotton Co., 27 TeL Civ. App. 366, 65 S.W. 390 (1901).
90. Early in the 19th century, courts freely discussed expanding exceptions to caveat
emptor in particular cases. In Rodgers & Co. v. Niles & Co., 11 Ohio St. 48 (1860), Judge
Scott observed: "The general rule of the common law undoubtedly is, that • • • the vendor
will not be held liable for any defects in the quality of the articles sold, in the absence of
fraud, or express warranty . • • . But to this general rule the requirements of manifest justice have introduced sundry exceptions, of which some are as well settled as the rule itself,
while as to others, the authorities cannot be easily reconciled." I d. at 53 (emphasis added).
91. 103 Mass. 331 (1869).
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plaintiff haP, sold defendant a quantity of "Manila Sugar," as described in the sale note. The defendant buyers refused to pay for
the sugar when delivered because it contained four percent sand.
The buyers argued that the seller had impliedly agreed to deliver
goods that would not only satisfy the bare description of Manila
sugar but would also not exceed in percentage of impurity "normal
Manila sugar"; thus advocating that the sale of goods which were
specifically described implied a warranty that the goods described
would be merchantable. The court was not prepared to accept so
radical a notion. In rejecting the defendant's contention, it stated
simply: "If [the buyers] had doubts about the goodness of the article, or did not choose to run the risk of latent defects, they should
have refused to purchase without a warranty upon these points."92
Twenty-two years later, the judicial atmosphere in Massachusetts had changed. In Murchie v. Cornell, 93 the plaintiffs had sold
the defendants a quantity of ice. Though the ice technically satisfied the contract description, it was not merchantable. The trial
judge had instructed the jury that the ice was ice if what was delivered to the defendant was cold and hard. As a result, a verdict was
rendered for the defendant. Justice Holmes, speaking for the state
supreme judicial court, reversed the trial court's judgment, summing in a single sentence twenty years of difficult judicial progress
toward extending a seller's liability for quality: "If a very vague,
generic word is used, like 'ice,' which, taken literally, may be satisfied by a worthless article, and the contract is a commercial contract, the court properly may instruct the jury that the word
means more than its bare definition in the dictionary, and calls for
a merchantable article of that name. " 94 ·

The Consumer and Quality Terms: Privity and
Disclaimers
The consumer-commercial buyer distinction was given little
explicit recognition until the 20th century. Rather, judicial energies had been focused on accommodating the traditional notion of
caveat emptor to the emerging realities of modern commerce. Only
after the most extreme features of caveat emptor were pruned
92. Id. at 334.
93. 155 Mass. 60, 29 N.E. 207 (1891).
94. Id. at 60, 29 N.E. at 207.
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away,95 did there appear the first glimmerings of the consumercommercial buyer distinction now judicially accepted.
This Article traces the evolution of the consumer into a figure
deserving special judicial solicitude in two ways. First, it examines
the ·erosion of privity as a bar to recovery for breach of warranty.
Second, it briefly surveys the judicial treatment of seller's disclaimers and restriction of warranty. In conjunction, these two inquiries should permit conclusions on the extent to which state
courts recognized the need of consumers for special warranty protection prior to the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
This Article defines "consumer" with reference to the buyer's
capacity to bargain effectively and intelligently over warranty
terms. 98 Neither the occupational status of the buyer nor the use to
which the buyer intends to put the goods should matter. Thus the
small businessperson who buys a delivery van from General Motors
or the modest farmer who purchases a tractor from Allis-Chalmers
is as fully deserving of consumer status as the householder who
buys a step ladder from the local hardware store.

Privity, the Consumer, and the "Death of Contract"
The decline of privity as an effective bar to recovery for
breach of warranty can be traced to a gradual judicial awakening
to changes in the American economy. So long as buyer and seller
dealt face to face, tort and contract rules as they had evolved by
the early years of this century gave the buyer a reasonable measure
of protection. As the production and distribution process became
95. At the turn of the 2oth century, the courts were divided between the old caveat
emptor rules and the new attitude which encouraged restriction of the doctrine. Typical of
the judicial dilemma was Gage v. Carpenter, 107 F. 886 (1st Cir. 1901), where the court
stated: "We do not understand that the civil law maxim caveat venditor, which is based
upon the idea that a sound or full price raises a warranty that the goods are sound, had
been fully adopted in common-law jurisdictions, although the harsh caveat emptor rule has
been qualified somewhat, so that the warranty of the vendor as to quality exists where he
sells property about which he assumes to have knowledge, or about which he alone has the
means of knowledge, or under such circumstances as it is the policy of the law to charge him
with knowledge ••••" Id. at 889.
96. Justice Peters, in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965), stated: "I would find that plaintiff was an ordinary consumer insofar as the
purchase involved here was concerned, even though he bought the truck for use in his business. Plaintiff was an owner-driver of a single truck he used for hauling and not a fleet
owner. • • . He was the final link in the marketing chain, having no more bargaining power
than does the usual individual who purchases a motor vehicle on the retail level." Id. at 2728, 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
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more complex, however, and as more parties intervened between
manufacturer and ultimate consumer, the rules which had served
well to adjust relations between the immediate buyer and seller no
longer seemed to work. Traditional doctrine had to be reexamined
and reshaped.
This reworking of traditional doctrine was not the result of
conscious judicial policymaking. Rather, it reflected the inadequacy of existing doctrine to resolve buyer-seller disputes in an unfamiliar setting.97 Efforts to adapt then prevailing notions of tort
and contract doctrine to changed economic conditions ultimately
dealt a fatal blow to privity as a means of restricting a remote
seller's liability and produced the modern law of "products
liability."98
The first efforts to break the barrier of privity and to extend
the manufacturer's liability to the ultimate consumer were in the
area of contract-warranty principles. Early reliance was placed
upon contract theory because doctrinal obstacles to nonprivity recovery in tort seemed insurmountable. Courts had great difficulty
in accepting the notion that parties to a contract owed a duty of
care to nonparties. Thus, tort law imposed a strict privity requirement as a condition of recovery.99 Moreover, the disposition to insist upon privity was reinforced by a strong philosophical and economic conviction that the burden of imposing tort liability upon
nonparties would present undue hardship to the manufacturing
enterprise.10° Finally, even after the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motors, 101 a plaintiff not in privity of contract was required to
97. See Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 887-95 (1967) (demonstrating
that products liability law has presented similar problems to the courts and legislatures of
many industrial societies).
98. The literature on products liability is vast. See, e.g., Green, Strict Liability Under
Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976); Henderson,
Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56
N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109
(1974); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 {1973).
This Article will examine only those cases in this field in which the courts have created a
special status for the consumer in products liability law.
99. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (pt. 2), 50 HARv. L. REv. 1225, 1232-34 (1937).
100. See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1903); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322 (2d Cir. 1912); Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (Ex. 1842).
101. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

November 1980]

LAW OF WARRANTY

361

establish negligence as a precondition to recovery in tort. 102 A suit
in contract for breach of warranty, on the other hand, could succeed without establishing fault, 103 although privity generally remained a requirement for recovery. ~
Perhaps ironically, the effort to escape the restrictive effects of
privity gained its first success in contract-warranty actions. Judicial resolve to retain the requirement of privity may have begun to
weaken when the strict application of the privity doctrine produced results which seemed, at best, bizarre. In Gearing v. Berkson, 105 for example, a husband and wife sued a retail butcher for
false warranty after both became ill from eating infected pork
chops. Both plaintiffs recovered in the trial court. The appellate
court affirmed the judgment for the husband; judgment for the
wife, however, was reversed. The court concluded that although
the wife had purchased the pork chops, she had done so in her
capacity as the agent of her husband. Thus she, as an agent, was
not in privity with the butcher, while her husband, as principal,
was in privity.108
The most persistent early efforts to create a recognized exception to the privity requirement in warranty actions occurred in
cases involving the sale of food. Resistance to relaxing the privity
barrier was considerable even here. 107 A few courts, however, began
to allow the individual food purchaser to recover against the remote manufacturer notwithstanding a lack of privity.108 Moreover,
at least one court made no effort to hide its impatience with the
injustice resulting from too rigid an insistence on privity.109
1

102. Id. at 384, 111 N.E. at 1053.
103. See e.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
104. See Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921);
Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 A. 271 (1910); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124
Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925); State v. Consolidated Gas Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924);
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
105. 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916).
.
106. Id. at 258, 111 N.E. at 786.
107. See, e.g., Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905).
108. Curiously, three of the cases in which privity was rejected as a bar to recovery
involved the same defendant: Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 70 A. 314 (1908); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 P. 633 (1913). On rare occasions an early court would find the means to dispense
with privity in a nonfood case. See, e.g., Richardson Mach. Co. v. Brown, 95 Kan. 685, 149
P. 434 (1915) (farm machinery sale).
·
109. In Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), Judge Noyes stated:
"The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of
10
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'The Supreme Court of Iowa in Davis v. Van Camp Packing
Co. 110 provide_d one of the most candid explanations for eliminating
the bar of privity to recovery in warranty in food cases. In Davis,
the plaintiff's mother had purchased from a local retailer a can of
beans manufactured by the defendant. The beans were adulterated
and the plaintiff suffered serious illness after eating them. The supreme court reversed a judgment for the defendant. The court initially offered a variety of plausible but ultimately unsatisfying explanations for its decision: "[The] implied warranty ... runs with
the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of the consumer . . . .
Or it may be treated as a representation or a warranty that, because of the sacredness of human life, food products so put out are
wholesome."111 The court's most significant comments, however,
addressed the changed economic climate in which the average citizen made purchases: "In the earlier cases . . . when a person went
to m"arket with a market basket on his arm, and could examine the
food, the doctrine [caveat emptor] was held to apply . . . . But the
business of canning food products of almost every kind has increased enormously in recent years. The purchaser has no opportunity of examination . . . ." 112
The particular significance of Davis and of other similar decisions was not that contracts involving food were considered to be
unique. 118 Rather, Davis and cases like it reflected an awareness
that mass production had profoundly changed the way in which
goods were bought and sold in the United States.U" The typical
buyer at the end of the distributive chain now commonly purthe law of sales. The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon privity
of contract. It should rest, as was once said, upon 'the demands of social justice.' " I d. at
323.
110. 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
111. I d. at 801, 176 N.W. at 392. The plaintiff in Davis was in no sense a "buyer" from
anyone as he was four times removed from the defendant manufacturer. The local grocer
from whom plaintiff's mother had purchased the beans had himself acquired them from a
local jobber. The jobber had purchased them from the defendant.
112. Id. at ~02, 176 N.W. at 392.
113. At least one court prior to Davis could not see any basis for treating the problems
of privity and implied warranty in food cases in a manner different from general sales law.
See Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908). See also Llewellyn,
On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 341, 404 (1937).
114. One ironic result of the reasoning in decisions allowing a buyer to recover against
a remote seller becaUse of changed manufacturing and distribution systems was that it was
used to deny recovery against the retailer with whom the buyer was in privity. See, e.g.,
Scroggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925). Contra, Ward v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918).
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chased packaged goods of uncertain origin and of unobservable
quality.
The courts used considerable imagination in developing explanations for the new rule that was applied in food cases. 1111 The consumer was said to be a third-party beneficiary of the retailer's contract with the manufacturer. 116 Some courts simply refused to
apply the privity requirement in food cases. 117 There was some
support for the view that applying a privity requirement in food
contracts was contrary to public policy. 118 The California Supreme
Court discovered provisions in the Uniform Sales Act which, in the
court's opinion, abolished the strict privity requirement. 119 None of
these explanations, however, explicitly addressed the fundamental
reason for the change in the privity requirements: an altered economic system that had created a radically different buyer-seller
relationship.
Predictably, plaintiffs soon began to argue that relaxation of
the privity bar should not be restricted to food cases. In Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 120 the plaintiff lost an eye when a pebble shattered the windshield of his Ford automobile. Ford had expressly
represented by a sticker affixed to the windshield that it was shatterproof. The court rejected Ford's defense of lack of privity for
two reasons. First, the buyer, an "ordinary person," had no reason
to know that the glass was other than what Ford represented it to
be. Second, the court stated:
Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast changes
have taken place in the economic structures of the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great
transition. Radio, billboards, and the products of the printing
press have become the means of creating a large part of the demand that causes goods to depart from factories to ultimate consumers. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit a
manufacturer of goods to create a demand for their products by
115. For a comprehensive listing of "exemptions" to the privity doctrine, see Gillam,
Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119, 153-57 (1958).
116. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
117. See, e.g., Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924).
118. See Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
119. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939). In fact, the
Uniform Sales Act does not refer to privity. Sections 12 through 16 (the warranty provisions), when read with the definitions of buyer and seller in § 76-1, make it difficult to
conclude that remote parties were intended to be included.
120. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932),
aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).

364

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

representing that they possess qualities which they . . . do not
possess and then, because there is no privity of contract . . . deny
the consumer the right to recover. 121

The court in Baxter, held Ford liable because it believed modern marketing conditions compelled that result.122 Although Baxter was not the only decision based on the manufacturer's advertising,123 it was perhaps the most forthright. Warranty was perceived
principally as a contract doctrine, and consequently many courts
had difficulty in accepting the extension of warranty liability to remote parties. The courts needed a broadly based legal theory that
would permit imposing liability on remote sellers outside the confining context of contract law. This theory was found in the rediscovery of warranty's origin in tort.
The courts had never really forgotten that the history of the
law of warranty was not purely contractual.124 References to the
doctrine's hybrid origins, however, seemed more often intended as
demonstrations of judi~ial erudition than as citations to relevant
law. The significance of warranty's dual character was, for a long
time, not really understood in the context of the battle over privity. At least one court frankly admitted that the cases were
confused.12G
A decision was needed which recognized a connection between
the modern economic reality and warranty's ancient foundations in
121. 168 Wash. at 462-63, 12 P.2d at 412.
122. Baxter's impact was considerable. Dean Prosser believed that the court in Baxter
relied upon tort rather than contract as a basis for abolishing the privity requirement. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1137 n.224 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]. Although there is dicta, particularly in the
court's opinion in the second appeal, which justifies the Prosser view, other language suggests that the court did not really intend to abandon contract-warranty analysis in order to
avoid problems of privity. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 125, 35 P.2d 1090,
1091 (1934). The Supreme Court of Michigan held for the plaintiff in Bahlan v. Hudson
Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939), on facts remarkably similar to those in
Baxter. The Michigan court rejected the suggestion that contributory negligence was a defense. The court, after citing Baxter, held that allowing the use of a tort defense would be
inconsistent with the rationale of the Baxter holding. Id. at 691-92, 288 N.W. at 311. The
Baxter decision was not universally followed. See Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,
96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938); Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937).
123. See Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956);
Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912); Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
124. See Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
125. See Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
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tort. This recognition was supplied in Decker & Sons Inc. v.
Capps. 126 In Decker the plaintiff's mother had purchased from a
local retailer meat processed by the defendant. The plaintiffs ate
the meat and became ill. In a suit for breach of implied warranty,
the judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed despite the defendant's argument that privity was indispensable to recovery. The
court first noted that the ultimate consumers in the modern market cannot protect themselves. 127 The court then went on to state
that although the action was in warranty, the warranty involved
"is not the more modern contractual warranty but is an obligation
imposed by law to protect public health. m 28 Quoting Professor
Williston in stating that warranty was originally a tort action, the
court insisted that only in the more recently developed contractual
action of warranty, derived from special assumpsit, was privity required. "Here the liability of the manufacturer and vendor is imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy for the protection of the public, and is not dependent on any provision of the
contract, either express or implied.m 29
Despite the undeniable appeal of the argument in Decker, it
did not immediately sweep away all that came before it. 130 Those
courts which rejected attempts to bleach warranty of its contractual coloration recognized the stakes involved. As long as warranty
was treated as an aspect of contract law, the requirement of privity
had some rational foundation. At the very least, the relationship
between contract and warranty allowed courts to consider privity
requirements on a case by case basis. The characterization of warranty as tort, however, removed privity as a condition of recovery.
Courts that did not accept the new tort-warranty notion accused jurisdictions that did of "strain[ing] for a beneficial re126. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
127. /d. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
128. /d. at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 831.
129. /d. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831-32.
130. Courts continued to render decisions requiring privity without acknowledging
that warranty originated in tort. See, e.g., Hermanson v. Hermanson, 19 Conn. Supp. 479,
117 A.2d 840 (1954); Duncan v. Juman, 25 N.J. Super. 330, 96 A.2d 415 (1953). Even in
Texas the courts refused to extend the Decker rationale beyond the context of food. See
Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (T~x. Civ. App. 1955). Other jurisdictions, however,
adopted the theory that warranty's origins in tort justified eliminating the privity requirement. See, e.g., Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944); Worley
v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1952).
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sult"131 or of assuming a right to recovery "without obviating the
limitations inherent in rights arising from contract relations. " 132
These objections had little impact despite the fact that no English
or early American case supported the contention that there could
be recovery in warranty absent a contractual relation. 133 Indeed,
there is evidence that a distinct, noncontractual theory of warranty
was without any consistent foundation in the cases prior to 1963.134
The California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Jnc. 13rs struck the decisive blow restricting the contract
theory and establishing a tort basis for recovery against a remote
seller. In this well known case, the plaintiff's wife purchased from a
local retailer a combination power tool manufactured by the defendant. While using the tool, the plaintiff suffered serious physical
injury caused by a design defect. The manufacturer argued that
the California version of the Uniform Sales Act required prompt
notice of product failure as a condition to recovery in warranty.
Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the court, distinguished warranties that are created by contract from those that arise independently of contract.136 He stated that a manufacturer is liable in tort
to a remote purchaser for injuries caused by a defective product on
grounds wholly independent of warranty. This strict tort liability is
justified, he said, because the cost of the injury is better borne by
the manufacturer than by injured persons unable to protect themselves.137 Chief Justice Traynor acknowledged that prior California
131. Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 57, 112 A.2d 701, 704 (1955).
132. Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 98, 3 A.2d 224, 226 (1938).
133. See Prosser, supra note 122, at 1127-28.
134. See Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 718-50 (1970).
135. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
136. Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
137. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Chief Justice Traynor made a
similar argument in an earlier California case: "Those who suffer injury from defective
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for
. the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way
into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury
they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture
of the product, is responsible for its reaching the'market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and however hapha2ardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a
constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant
protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection." Escola v. Coca-
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cases138 had relied on statutory standards to determine a defendant's liability for breach of warranty, but he contended that such
references to statutory authority were appropriately adopted under
the circumstances of the particular case.139 These earlier decisions
emphasized warranty's tort origins to avoid entangling contract
principles. The Greenman case went beyond these earlier decisions
and articulated a new grounds for imposing liability on remote sellers: a theory of strict responsibility independent of warranty. The
justification for this new doctrine was frankly based on policy
grounds.
The impact of Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Greenman
was immediate and widespread. Dean Prosser cited Greenman in
support of section 402A in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
strict liability provision involving defective products.140 Judicial
enthusiasm to embrace the Greenman rationale141 reached such
heights that some commentators implied that it was unseemly. 142
One cause of the ·development and rapid acceptance of the
strict liability theory was a burgeoning sensitivity to the ultimate
consumer's particular needs. Chief Justice Traynor described the
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Justice Traynor's risk spreading theory is a fundamental justification for the development of
much of products liability law. The logic of Justice Traynor's view seems unassailable. The
economic implications of the risk spreading argument, however, are far from clear. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
138. See Dana v. Sutton Motor Sales, 56 Cal. 2d 284, 363 P.2d 881, 14 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1961); Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
139. 59 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
140. 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 354 (1964). It is not inaccurate to link the Greenman opinion with § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Chief Justice Traynor was a member
of the Board of Advisors for the Restatement. Dean Prosser was the Reporter. Chief Justice
Traynor's opinion in Greenman contains multiple citations to Dean Prosser's work. Dean
Prosser, in turn, was responsible for drafting succeeding versions of § 402A, the first of
which he introduced in 1961. See 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 50-56 (1961). So closely did Dean
Prosser observe the progress of strict liability in the courts that in 1964 he requested that
the 1962 version of§ 402A (which applied only to food and products for intimate bodily use)
be withdrawn in light of rapid developments in the courts. 41 ALI PROCEEDINGS 349 (1964).
141. See, e.g., Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284,
216 A.2d 189 (1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
142. See generally Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 998-1004 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Franklin]; Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 715-18 (1970).
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average consumer as "powerless" to protect himself or herself from
the costs of physical injuries caused by defective products.143 The
comments to section 402A offer justification in terms of the needs
of the consumer for the innovations introduced by that section.144
In response to these developments, sellers seeking protection
from liability for defective products increasingly insisted on a contract based theory of warranty with its allied requirement of privity. The impatience of some courts when confronted with the contract theory was evident.145 Many responded by embracing the
strict tort theory of seller's liability.146 When confronted with tort
defenses, some courts responded by returning to a contract centered analysis. 147 Ultimately some jurisdictions avoided this vacillation between tort and contract principles by treating consumers
as a class specially protected by warranty rules. 148
Not every judge warmly embraced the brave new world in
which the remote seller was made liable to the ultimate consumer
on the theory that best served the purpose of the moment. Some
judicial discontent reflected an attachment to categories of liability
long since discarded, 149 but other judges expressed fears having a
firmer basis than nostalgia. In Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 150 the majority affirmed a judgment for strict liability in
favor of an injured airplane passenger against the manufacturer of
the plane and a supplier of component parts. Judge Burke, dissenting, stated that the facts of cases such as Goldberg placed
them outside the purpose of sales law and that "the warranty rationale is at best a useful fiction."m He went on to state that if
strict or enterprise liability was to be the basis for a new line of
decisions then "this court cannot escape the responsibility of justifying it."152 Judge Burke's dissent was conservative in the best
143. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment (1965).
145. See, e.g., Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 329 ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1946).
146. See note 141 supra.
147. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 484-85 (3d Cir.
1965).
148. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (Fla. App. 1965),
aff'd, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
149. See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 250-56, 147 N.E.2d
612, 616-20 (1958) (Taft, J., concurring in part).
150. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
151. Id. at 439-40, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (Burke, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
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sense. His argument with the majority was that legal doctrine
founded so completely upon a social vision of the vulnerable consumer must be carefully qualified and tightly reasoned; cases in
which such innovations are introduced can create an impenetrable
fog of complexity that ends by defeating the aspirations of the
reformers. 1113
Developments in the case law made Judge Burke a prophet
sooner than perhaps even he had hoped, or feared. Ironically, it
was Chief Justice Traynor who was principally responsible for
blunting the edge of the strict liability doctrine he had proposed in
Greenman. In Seely v. White Motor Co., IM the plaintiff had purchased from a dealer a truck manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer seeking repair
costs, recovery of the portion of the purchase price paid, and lost
profits. The plaintiff contended that the truck had been defective
and that its frequent breakdowns had caused significant business
loss. The trial court held there was no strict liability because it
could find no causal link between the asserted defect in the truck
and the accident. The trial court, however, awarded plaintiff recovery for all his losses except repair costs on the theory of express
warranty. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in
cases of express warranty, privity was not required.
Chief Justice Traynor, in dicta, stated that strict liability in
tort had not superseded warranty theory in cases involving defective products. He reasoned that strict liability had developed to
afford recovery for personal injuries. Rules of warranty, he wrote,
continue to serve well in a commercial setting. By this he meant
that contract based concepts such as disclaimer, privity, and the
requirement that notice of defects be promptly given remained viable doctrines in cases of nonphysical injury. Chief Justice Traynor
agreed that property damage would ordinarily be recoverable in
strict liability, but that the plaintiff had failed to show that the
defect caused the accident.
The court's opinion specifically declined to limit the application of warranty law to cases where the parties stood in equal bargaining positions. The rationale of Greenman, Chief Justice Traynor wrote, "does not rest on the analysis of the financial strength
153. Id.
154. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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or bargaining power of the parties to the particular action." 1 .s11 In so
concluding, Chief Justice Traynor rejected the reasoning of recently decided New Jersey cases which held that the relevance of
privity and other contract related notions depended upon the status of the buyer as a consumer or a commercial buyer.1116
Justice Peters, in a dissenting opinion, felt that the Seely majority misapprehended and misapplied legal history. Justice Peters
conceded that cases involving personal injury were among the first
in which strict liability had been invoked. He stated, however, that
the nature of the plaintiffs' injury in those early cases was the occasion but not the reason for the application of strict liability
theory:
The majority recognize that the rules governing warranties were
developed to meet the needs of "commercial transactions." If this
is so, then why not look to the transaction between the buyer and
the seller and see if it was a "commercial" transaction rather than
a sale to an ordinary consumer at the end of the marketing chain?
... Any line which determines whether damages should be covered by warranty law or the strict liability doctrine should be
drawn at the time the sale is made. 1117

The Seely opinion has been persuasive in leading many courts
to refuse recovery, in the absence of privity, to consumers whose

loss is merely economic.158 Yet Chief Justice Traynor's rationale
for the dichotomy Seely creates between personal injury and eco155. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
156. See Santor v. A & M Karagheunsian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Chief Justice Traynor's
opinion in Seely approved the result in Santor (seller liable to consumer absent privity on
strict liability theory for economic loss) but would have based the decision on express warranty. 63 Cal. 2d at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The court in Santor made no
reference to express warranty.
157. 63 Cal. 2d at 26, 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (Peters, J., dissenting).
158. The meaning of the term economic loss has become complicated. Professor
Franklin has identified five distinct types of losses recognized by the courts in products
liability litigation: (1) personal injury; (2) physical property damage; (3) repair loss (damage
to the defective product); (4) expectation loss (losses caused by the product's failure to perform); (5) nondefective product loss (measured by the difference between the product's actual value and the value it would have had had it not been defective). See Franklin, supra
note 142, at 981-82. Professor Edmeades has identified three categories of damage: (1) personal injury; (2) direct damage (what Professor Franklin would term "nondefective product
loss"), and (3) property damage. Professor Edmeades defines direct damage as economic loss
although conceding that the distinction between property damage and economic loss is
sometimes hard to draw. Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss
, in Americar.t Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 650-52 (1977). See generally
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLuM. L. REV. 917 (1966).
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nomic loss when bared to its premises, is unconvincing. In Seely,
he stated that warranty theory is appropriate for dealing with commercialloss.1119 Then in a law review article subsequent to Seely, he
asserted that consumers who suffer economic loss are, by definition, operating in a commercial setting. 16° Chief Justice Traynor,
however, never explained how the character of the injury suffered
determines whether the transaction is of commercial or consumer
character. 161 Absent such an explanation, the distinction is a nebulous concept.
The distinction between physical injury and economic loss has
been invoked with curious results in California,162 and with confusion elsewhere, as is vividly illustrated by the Alaska Supreme
Court's opinion in Morrow v. New Moon Homes Inc. 163 The court's
opinion merits detailed examination because the decision reflects
so many of the problems caused by the Seely doctrine. In New
Moon, the plaintiffs purchased a house trailer manufactured by the

-

159. 63 Cal. 2d at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
160. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965). One possible explanation for Chief Justice Traynor's refusal
to recognize a right to recover, absent privity, in Seely is that precedent exists which denies
recovery for economic loss for negligence to a party not in privity. See Franklin, supra note
142, at 983-84. Professor Franklin has suggested that the better course might have been for
the court in Seely to reconsider prior negligence cases which had denied recovery for economic loss rather than to use those cases indirectly as a justification for refusing the plaintiff relief in Seely. I d.
161. The distinction between property damage-physical injury and economic loss was
justified in Seely on the grounds that property damage-physical injury is likely to be a more
"overwhelming misfortune" than mere economic loss. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 23. Courts explain the distinction on the basis that physical injury-property
damage is more likely to occur suddenly in an accident. Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 320, 405
P.2d 502, 504 (1965) (O'Connell, J., dissenting). These distinctions, insofar as they attempt
to explain the availability or unavailability of strict liability, are spurious. It is unclear why
a consumer should recover in strict liability when a defect in his or her car causes it to catch
fire, but be denied recovery when slow oxidation caused by a defect in the metal results in
substantial rust damage. See Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic
Loss in American Products Liability Jurisprudence, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 652
(1977).
162. In Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972),
the plaintiff sought recovery for what the majority found to be mere economic loss caused
by defective wheels purchased from the defendant. Having concluded that the plaintiff's
loss was merely economic, the court denied recovery in the absence of privity. I d. at 446-48,
102 Cal. Rptr. at 114-16. A dissenting opinion maintained that because the vehicle suffered
minor tire and spring damage caused by the defective wheels, the wheels were "constructively destroyed." The constructive destruction of the wheels made this a case of property
damage and thus it was argued that privity should not bar recovery. Id. at 453, 102 Cal.
Rptr. at 120 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
163. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
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defendant. The trailer was never satisfactory because of numerous
and substantial defects. Any loss to the plaintiffs, however, was
merely economic. At the time plaintiffs brought suit, the retailer
from whom they had purchased the trailer was no longer in business. The plaintiff's theory of recovery in the trial court was breach
of implied warranty. The trial court, however, refused to award the
plaintiff a judgment against the manufacturer because privity was
lacking.
On appeal, the plaintiffs attempted to remedy the problem
created by the lack of privity by arguing that strict liability in tort
does not require priviW and is so closely related to breach of implied warranty that the same pleadings will support recovery on
either theory. With this the Alaska Supreme Court agreed. The
court noted, however, that strict liability was available only in the
cruie of physical injury or property damage. Conceding that the authorities were divided on the point, the court stated that it preferred the result in Seely.uu The court also rejected strict liability
analysis in cases of economic loss because it believed it owed deference to the legislative judgment represented by enactment of the
Uniform Commericial Code (UCC). 1615
Having invoked the Seely decision to reject strict liability, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs' right to recovery must be determined under relevant provisions of the UCC governing implied
warranties. The court noted that the UCC provides the seller certain means to minimize liability for economic loss. Under the UCC
the seller enjoys "a predictable definition of potential liability for
direct economic loss. " 166
Yet even under the UCC warranty approach the Alaska Supreme Court faced the necessity of resolving the privity issue
which the trial court had decided against the buyer. The court declared that "policy considerations which dictate the abolition of
privity are largely those which also warranted imposing strict tort
liability on the manufacturer: the consumer's inability to protection himself adequately from defectively manufactured
164. Id. at 285.
165. See note 166 & accompanying text infra.
166. 548 P.2d at 286. Section 2-714(2) of the UCC provides: "The measure of damage
for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
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goods . . . ." 167 The more difficult question was whether to extend
the abolition of privity to warranty actions in which purely economic loss was involved. The court noted that other courts had
been hesitant to dispense with the privity requirement in nonpersonal injury cases. It also noted that the UCC maintained a distinction between direct economic loss and consequential economic
loss which includes personal injury. 168
Having observed that the privity question in warranty was the same as in strict liability and that the UCC distinguished mere economic loss from personal injury, the court abolished privity requirements in warranty actions involving economic loss. Moreover,
after citing the majority opinion in Seely as a basis for rejecting
the application of strict liability in economic loss cases, the court
stated that Justice Peters' dissenting opinion in Seely "persuasively establishes that the cleavage between economic loss and
other types of harm is a false one, that each species of harm can
constitute the overwhelming misfortune in one's life which warrants judicial redress."169
The New Moon decision is difficult to explain.170 The court
rejected the relevance of strict liability because the Seely personal
injury-economic loss distinction appealed to it, stating that it was
compelled to resort to a UCC based contract-warranty analysis because the legislature had the final authority in the matter. The
court even referred to UCC sections that preserved contract-warranty doctrines such as disclaimer and the requirement that the
buyer give the seller prompt notice of defects. Yet, in dispensing
with the requirement of privity, the court referred to economic realities which made the use of such contract doctrines irrelevant.171
Finally, having cited the majority opinion in Seely as authority for
167. 548 P.2d at 289.
168. Id. at 289-90 & n.34.
169. Id. at 291.
170. Professor Franklin would undoubtedly disagree. "The Code seems to be saying
that so long as courts adhere to warranty principles they may follow or dispense with privity
as they see fit, but they must limit liability by warranty principles in either case." Franklin,
supra note 142, at 1001. Yet in light of the court's justification in New Moon for waiving the
privity requirement (the irrelevancy of the distinction between property damage-physical
injury and economic loss), one must ask once more why, given the court's explanation for
the inapplicability of strict tort liability, it felt compelled to decide the case using a UCC
analysis.
171. The court's opinion did, however, refer to the doctrine of unconscionability
(U.C.C. § 2-302) as a means of providing buyer protection from seller's excesses within the
framework of the court's preferred contract analysis. 548 P.2d at 292.
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the importance of the personal injury-economic loss distinction,
the coillt invoked the authority of Justice Peters' dissent in support of the view that the same distinction was irrational.
The reasoning of the court in New Moon suffered from a "confusion of the categoriesm72 not unknown among those who have
attempted to make sense out of this legal area. Symptoms of this
confusion may be found in a number of other recent decisions.173
Products-liability law, as a discrete category of the law, developed
at least partly as a means of making warranty principles relevant
to modern economic conditions. Privity was perceived as a major
barrier to modernizing warranty law. The perceived need to eliminate the privity bar was a major factor in developing rules of strict
liability for defective products.174 Although there has been general
agreement that modem marketing conditions have created a different kind of consumer with special problems, there has been much
less agreement as to the best means of extending protection to that
consumer.1715
Many commentators argue that tort concepts deserve primacy
and that contract principles are antique impediments standing in
the way of a sensible new legal order. This attitude is exemplified
by the drafters of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
It should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a
very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the
sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various contract
rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity
of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the prod172. This term is a borrowed and modified version of Professor John Dawson's wonderfully evocative phrase "a hardening of the categories." J. DAwsoN & W. HARVEY, CASES
ON CONTRACTS 132 {34 ed. 1977).
173. See, e.g., McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 {Me. 1973). Compare
Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 {1973), with Herbstman v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 {1975).
174. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial

Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5, 24 {1965).
175. · The tendency in recent years has been to permit consumer recovery for economic
loss notwithstanding a lack of privity. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544
P.2d 983 {1976); Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 {Fla. 1967); Nobility Homes of
Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 539 S.W.2d 190 {Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff'd, 557 S.W.2d 77 {Tex.
1977). Plaintiff buyers in a commercial setting have not always been successful in arguing
the irrelevance of privity in cases of economic loss. See, e.g., Salmon Rivers Sportsman
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air. Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 {1975).
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uct, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. . . . It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated as
merely one of strict liability in tort. 178

It is not so simple as the drafters lead one to believe. The history
of warranty is complex. Much of that history has involved an intimate association with the law of contract. The contract legacy with
which that association has invested the law of warranty cannot be
merely brushed aside by imperious words, analogizing its principles
to strict liability in tort.
Other commentators have persuasively argued that a tort
based approach to consumer protection in the warranty-products
liability area is inconsistent with many of the policies embodied in
article 2 of the UCC. 177 These scholars contend that the drafters of
the UCC took note of the consumer's place in the modern economic order and intended to adjust the rights between consumers
and sellers in accordance with the contract principles contained in
article 2. The courts have generally ignored the scholarly arguments urging primacy of the UCC. Rather, a fair sampling of recent cases in the consumer-warranty area discloses the relative insignificance of the UCC in influencing judicial behavior in this
area. 178
Recalling the historical lessons of the preceding analysis of the
decline of privity, the failure of the UCC's contractual analysis to
prevail is quite understandable. The basic force which carried the
antiprivity advocates to victory was a broadly based recognition by
the courts that the modern consumer was inadequately protected
by classical contract doctrine. Indeed, the struggle over privity may
have been the cause of the courts' recognition of consumers as a
distinct class. The UCC, of course, introduced many innovations
into the existing common law, but the drafters' very equivocal position on the privity question is suggestive that they only margin176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A, Comment m (1965).
177. See generally Franklin, supra note 142; Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products
Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses,
Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5, 24 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv.
713 (1970).
178. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Milbank
Mut. Ins, Co. v. Prokosik, 309 Minn. 106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976); Herbstman v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398
S.W.2d 240 (1966). There have been exceptions. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes,
Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
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ally considered problems relating strictly to consumer transac~
tions. 179 A very able scholar has rightly argued that "the Code's
generai approach . . . is dealing with the process by which parties
may allocate risks and not the substantive question of who winds
up with how much of the risk."~ 80 The essence of consumer status,
. as understood by most courts, is that there is little capacity or op~
portunity, if any, to bargain over risk allocation. This is particu~
larly true when the consumer is not in privity with the defendant
seller~manufacturer. 181 Because the UCC operates on the assump~
tion that the buyer can bargain over risk allocation even in trans~
actions when such an ability is fictional, courts have found the
UCC inadequate to deal with the reality of the typical consumer
sales transaction. The courts therefore have sought and found
other sources of legal rules more responsive to judicially perceived
economic reality.
More than forty years ago it was presciently suggested that
existing legal categories would prove inadequate to analyze the le~
gal complications resulting from modern manufacturing and mer~
chandising methods. It was further suggested that a new legal con~
struct would be needed to deal with the new reality. 182 It probably
would have been better if the courts had followed this suggestion.
Not surprisingly, however, they did not. The profession's conserva~
tism suggested that the courts choose a conservative method of
dealing with the need for innovation by adapting existing doctrine.183 The result has been the development of a highly complex
and sometimes contradictory body of rules aimed at addressing
consumer needs. The preceding pages focused on only one aspect
of that process: the justification for eliminating the privity requirement. What may be observed is that in working to extend
179; Section 2-318 of the UCC provides states with three alternatives that reflect varying degrees of liberality on the privity question. Comment 3 to § 2-318 professes neutrality
beyond the ruies contained in the section itself. Courts, intent on protecting a buyer not in
privity, have not always been deterred by what seems to be the plain meaning of their
state's version of § 2-318. See McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913 (Me. 1973);
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prokosk, 309 Minn. 106, 244 N.W.2d 105 (1976).
180. Franklin, supra note 142, at 995.
181. But see Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in
American Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 647, 681 (1977).
182. Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their. Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 155-58 (1937).
183. Professor Morris well described the inherent conservatism of the legal p~ofession
when he wrote that lawYers "tend to view every inroad on habit as a catastrophic revolution." R. MoRRIS, SEVEN WHO SHAPED OUR DESTINY 86 (1973).
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warranty protection to remote parties, the courts early developed a
clear conception of the consumer as a special class and have been
consistent in preserving the distinction between consumers and
commercial buyers. 184

Consumers, Disclaimers, and Freedom of Contract
The concept of freedom of contract has had a powerful effect
upon the development of the law; only with reluctance have courts
countenanced' its diminution. 18 ~ Yet modern economic conditions
have eroded the marketplace equality between contracting parties
that is the basis of freedom of contract. 186
One area of contract law in which the theory of freedom of
contract collides with modern marketplace reality is attempted disclaimers or restrictions on warranties by sellers. The judicial response to such behavior has produced, in recent years, a recognition that the consumer belongs to a distinct legal class.

Judicial Restriction of Disclaimers
Many sellers, particularly in the early years of the 20th century, eschewed the outright disclaimer. Instead they carefully
drafted warranties that required the buyer to overcome a number
of difficult hurdles before asserting a breach of warranty against
the seller.187 Strict and often very short notice requirements were
184. A handful of jurisdictions have resisted the relaxation of privity requirements
long accepted elsewhere. See, e.g., Necktas v. General Motors Corp., 357 Mass. 546, 259
N.E.2d 234 (1970). In at least one case the United States Court of Appeals found the means
to avoid the consequences of the Massachusetts privity requirement. See White's Farm
Dairy, Inc. v. De Laval Separator Co., 433 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1970). The Massachusetts Legislature finally intervened to elimiilate the privity requirement. See Town of Mansfield v.
G.A.F. Corp., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 364 N.E.2d 1292 (1977); Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc.,
40 N.C. App. 641, 253 S.E.2d 629 (1979).
185. See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1940). Some eminent judges have vociferously defended the principle of freedom of contract.
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (Harlan, J.); Printing & Numerical
Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
186. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
187. To convey a sense of the burden seller's warranties imposed upon the buyer as
well as the flavor of early 20th century warranty language, the following warranty is taken
from Acme Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Barkley, 22 S.D. 458, 461, 118 N.W. 690, 691 (1908):
"Any machine of our make is guaranteed to do good and efficient work for which it is intended when properly operated. The purchaser shall have one day to give it a fair trial.
Should the implement then fail to fulfill this warranty, notice is to be given at once to the
dealer from whom the machine was purchased, and after the dealer has used his best efforts,
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imposed. 188 Buyers were sometimes commanded to send notice of
defects only by registered letter.189 Frequently, warranty provisions
also notified the buyer that no agent of the seller was authorized to
waive any of the many requirements imposed by the written
warranty.190
Had the courts given literal effect to these seller-oriented warranty requirements, buyers rarely would have succeeded in imposing meaningful quality obligations upon commercial sellers. Many
courts, however, found means by which to extend reasonable warranty protection to deserving buyers. The most frequently used judicial device was the doctrine of waiver. 191 When problems developed with contract goods, the seller would habitually dispatch an
employee to correct the problem. Despite contract language which
purported to preclude labeling this conduct a waiver of contract
rights, courts were quite resourceful in discovering some facet of
the seller's behavior which justified inferring an intention to forego
and should the machine still fail to fulfill the warranty, then both the purchaser and the
dealer are to give immediate notice to the Acme Harvester Company (incorporated) at Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois, or to their authorized general agent, stating wherein the machine fails to fulfill the warranty, and a reasonable time is to be allowed for instructions to
be given or if necessary, the sending of a person to put it in order or to remedy the defects,
if any; the purchaser rendering any necessary assistance and furnishing suitable teams, etc.,
when if it cannot be made to fulfill the warranty, he shall return it tb the place he received
free of charge, and in as good a condition as when received and ~ new ntachine will be given
in its place, or the notes and money will be refunded. Under no circumstances will the
machine be allowed to be returned without an understanding and direct instructions from
the Acme Harvesting Company. If notice of difficulty be not received as above states, it will
be conclusive evidence of satisfaction." The burden placed upon the buyer by this "warranty" is substantial, and the seller has numerous defenses to an asserted breach if the
buyer fails to satisfy any one of the numerous requirements. What is perhaps more surprising is that the standard warranty used by the farm implement industry has remained remarkably unchanged to the present. Compare the warranty language in J.I. Case Co. v.
Boothe, 227 Ark. 69, 70, 296 S.W.2d 894, 895 (1956), with that reproduced from the Acme
Harvester case decided fifty years before. The similarities are striking.
188. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Boothe, 227 Ark. 69, 269 S.W.2d 894 (1956); Monroe &
Monroe, Inc. v. Cowne, 133 Va. 181, 112 S.E. 848 (1922).
189. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Mallary Bros. Mach. Co., 6 Ga. App. 848, 66 S.E. 146
(1909).
190. See, e.g., Peter v. Plano Mfg. Co., 21 S.D. 198, 110 N.W. 783 (1907).
191. See, e.g., Gullett Gin Co. v. Seagraves, 49 Ga. App. 850, 176 S.E. 922 (1934); W.
H. Bintz Co. v. Meuggler, 65 Idaho 760, 154 P.2d 513 (1944); Schaefer v. Fiedler, 116 Ind.
App. 226, 63 N.E.2d 310 (1945); Maxwell Implement Co. v. Fitzgerald, 85 Ind. App. 206, 146
N.E. 883 (1925); Daugherty v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 190 Iowa 424, 180 N.W. 277
(1920); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Mason, 76 Kan. 607, 92 P. 545 (1907); Juvland v. Wood
Bros. Thresher Co., 212 Minn. 310, 3 N.W.2d 772 (1942); Reitan v. Wilkinson, 154 Okla. 163,
7 P.2d 486 (1932); Peter v. Plano Mfg. Co., 21 S.D. 198, 110 N.W. 783 (1907); Monroe &
Monroe, Inc. v. Cowne, 133 Va. 181, 112 S.E. 848 (1922).
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strict compliance with burdensome warranty terms. 192 Only occasionally did the courts even obliquely suggest the reasons for finding a waiver of contract rights. 198
The waiver doctrine was not always used to protect the buyer.
Sellers often succeeded in claiming the full benefit of restrictive
warranty provisions. 194 In many of the cases in which the buyer
lost, however, there is clear evidence that the court doubted the
buyer's good faith. 1911 This suggests that refusal to invoke the
waiver doctrine sometimes had less to do with a theoretical attachment to notions of freedom of contract than with the court's practical judgment about the decency of the buyer's behavior. This suspicion is explicitly confirmed in one case in which the court
declined to use the waiver doctrine on the buyer's behalf because it
was convinced that the seller "acted in the utmost good faith and
that he was not looking for a pretext to avoid the terms of the
contract . . . ." 196
Waiver of warranty requirements was by no means the only
device by which courts sought to protect the consumer from overreaching sellers. Many courts manipulated the rules of offer and
acceptance to push back or eliminate altogether the moment at
which an unreasonably short "notice of defect" clause began to
run. 197 Many judges were also prepared to deal firmly with a
seller's attempts to give a strained reading to warranty language
drafted with the seller's interests in view. 198 Other courts dealt
192. See note 191 supra.
193. In explaining its conclusion that the seller had waived its right to notice by registered mail, one court stated that such a construction allows the courts "to avoid the forfeiture and to leave the actual merits of the case open to investigation." McDaniel v. Mallary
Bros. Mach. Co., 6 Ga. App. 848, 851, 66 S.E. 146, 147 (1909).
194. See, e.g., Kirkland v. John Deere Plow Co., 66 Ga. App. 304, 18 S.E.2d 109 (1941);
Neon Lights Advertising Co. v. Briggs, 60 Ga. App. 135, 3 S.E.2d 113 (1939); Jewell v. Massillon Engine & Thresher Co., 198 Ky. 22, 247 S.W. 1117 (1923); Colt Co. v. Ryals, 186 So.
315 (Miss. 1939); Moline Plow Co. v. Adair, 76 Okla. 4, 183 P. 499 (1919).
195. See Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Burnett, 126 Kan. 453, 268 P. 740 (1928);
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Biddle, 110 Kan. 365, 203 P. 725 (1922); Acme
Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Barkley, 22 S.D. 458, 118 N.W. 691 (1908).
196. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Born, 189 Wis. 309, 316, 206 N.W. 904, 907
(1926).
197. See, e.g., Williams v. Bullock Tractor Co., 186 Cal. 32, 198 P. 780 (1921); MasseyHarris Co. v. Quick, 227 Mo. App. 736, 42 S.W.2d 47 (1931); Buckley v. Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co., 106 Neb. 214, 183 N.W. 105 (1921); Kemper v. Advance Thresher Co., 44 Tex.
Civ. App. 128, 97 S.W. 1078 (1906).
198. A particularly striking example of this may be found in Oliver Farm Equip. Co. v.
Patch, 134 Kan. 314, 5 P.2d 795 (1931). In Patch the seller of a threshing machine sued the
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with arguably unfair warranty terms by insisting that language of
limitation or disclaimer drafted by the seller be strictly
construed.199
Many courts, however, took a less proconsumer view of contract warranty terms. They did not hesitate to give literal effect to
restrictive clauses drafted by the seller.200 Taken as a whole, the
cases conflict and do not supply fum evidence of a consistent judicial sympathy for either the consumer or the commercial seller.201
farmer-buyer for failure to pay the purchase price. The buyer counterclaimed for breach of
warranty. The seller argued that language in the contract that "[f]ailure of any separate
machine or part shall not involve other machines, or parts, or damages" meant that the
defendant had agreed not to claim any damages for breach of warranty. To this argument
the court replied: "If such interpretation is correct, we can but marvel what purpose was to
be served by putting any warranty in the contract •.•. On the assumption that this wellsounding language [of warranty] meant something •.. [i]t would be stretching language
unduly as well as unfairly to defendant-since be did not formulate its terms-to bold that
the warranty for his benefit was set at naught by the debatable language of the clause which
provided that the failure of a separate machine should not involve damages." Id. at 319, 5
P.2d at 797 (emphasis original). For another case to the same effect but with less unbridled
language, see Harrison v. Russell & Co., 12 Idaho 624, 87 P. 785 (1906).
199. See, e.g., Murray Co. v. Morgan, 280 F. 499 (4th Cir. 1922); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Fields, 90 Minn. 161, 95 N.W. 886 (1903).
200. See, e.g., O.S. Stapley Co. v. Newly, 57 Ariz. 24, 110 P.2d 547 (1941); Buckley v.
Shell Chem. Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 209, 89 P.2d 453 (1939); Willson v. Riddle, 128 Conn. 100,
20 A.2d 402 (1941); Kibbe v. Woodruff, 94 Conn. 443, 109 A. 169 (1920); Payne v. Chal-Max
Motor Co., 25 Ga. App. 677, 104 S.E. 453 (1920); Harmon v. Coonrod, 148 Kan. 146, 79 P.2d
831 (1938); Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Stoops, 105 Kan. 16, 262 P. 604 (1928); Hopkinsville Motor Co. v. Massie, 228 Ky. 569, 15 S.W.2d 423 (1929); Ray Motor Co. v. Stonyan,
123 Me. 346, 122 A. 874 (1923); Industrial Fin. Corp. v. Wheat, 142 Miss. 536, 107 So. 382
(1926); Russell & Co. v. Legg, 222 Mo. App. 819, 10 S.W.2d 326 (1928); Getzoff v. Von
Lengerke Buick Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 750, 187 A. 539 (1936); Armour Fertilizer Works v. Aiken,
175 N.C. 398, 95 S.E. 657 (1918); Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Hawhee, 187 Okla. 670, 105
P.2d 410 (1940); Stark v. George, 252 S.W. 1053 (Tex. App. 1923).
201. The great majority of cases thus far cited in this section of the Article deal with
contracts to buy farm implements. These cases remained the mainstay of the courts in developing rules regarding warranty limitation and disclaimer until well into the second decade of the 20th century. At that time, the impact of the automobile on American life began
to be reflected in the case reports. There is little in this area of law to provide the weary
scholar with humorous relief. One such rare moment has been made possible by Justice
Silas Weaver of the Iowa Supreme Court who had irreverence enough to reproduce in full
the following warranty: "The Worcester-Kemp manure spreader has had nearly thirty years
of this field experience. Every part has been demonstrated in actual field work; it is strong,
simple and mechanically right. It does its work with a certainty that is not disturbed by any
possible local conditions. The Worcester-Kemp is well built in every detail. Every particle of
material has its office to perform and forms its part of the magnificent whole." Loxtercamp
v. Lininger Implement Co., 147 Iowa 29, 31, 125 N.W. 830, 831 (1910). Justice Weaver had
more than a good sense of humor; he had an exceptional grasp of warranty law. See American Fruit Prod. Co. v. Davenport Vinegar & Pickling Works, 172 Iowa 683, 154 N.W. 1031
(1915); Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer, 127 Iowa 137, 102 N.W. 840 (1905).
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Warranty cases decided in the first third of the 20th century
reveal a growing sensitivity to the relevance of the contracting parties' status in interpreting particular warranty terms. Sensitivity to
status is evidenced both in cases where the buyer is in business
and in cases where tlie buyer is included in the definition of "consumer," relating to the buyer's capacity to bargain effectively and
intelligently over warranty terms. 202 In commercial cases, the
courts consistently rejected buyer's pleas for a liberal or elastic
reading of warranty requirements~ using language to the effect that
both parties had equal technical ability203 or that "both parties by
reason of their occupation had expert knowledge of the kinds of
[products] in question . . . ."204 Reluctance to relieve commerical
buyers of the consequences of a hard bargain was thus not uncommon. 2015 In contrast, the consumer was quite often the beneficiary
of genuine judicial sympathy. In consumer cases, courts frequently
emphasized that the "buyer had very little knowledge of
automobiles"206 or that the buyer "was no judge of the materials
and from the looks of it could not tell whether it was defective or
not."2o7
The cases involving restrictive warranties or general disclaimer
provisions which limited the duties imposed upon sellers were frequently part of the so-called "form pad" or standardized contract.208 It is enough to note that those who have assayed the significance of form contracts agree upon at least three propositions:
(1) form contracts do not conform to the model of the individually
negotiated agreement which was the basis for the development of
traditional contract rules;209 (2) the standardized contract is the in202. See note 96 & accompanying text supra.
203. Carleton v. Jenks, 80 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1897).
204. Alexander v. Stone, 29 Cal. App. 488, 490, 156 P. 998, 999 (1916).
205. See Huber Mfg. Co. v. H. Crawford & Sons, 175 F. 219 (D. Pa. 1909); Bagley v.
General Fire Extinguisher Co., 150 F. 284 (2d Cir. 1906); William A. Davis Co. v. Bertrand
Seed Co., 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 P. 123 (1928); Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 196 Mass. 440, 82
N.E. 682 (1907).
206. Gilmore v. Butts, 198 A.D. 108, 109, 189 N.Y.S. 712, 713 (1921).
207. Indiana Silo Co. v. Harris, 134 Ark. 218, 223, 203 S.W. 581, 584 (1918). See also
Moore v. Koger, 113 Mo. App. 423, 426, 87 S.W. 602, 603 (1905). But see Hoyt v. Hainsworth Motor Co., 112 Wash. 440, 192 P. 918 (1920).
208. See generally Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts-An Introduction, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1307 (1978); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971).
209. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-

382

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

evitable product of modern mass production and distribution techniques;210 and (3) although form contracts are an aid to economic
efficiency, they can easily become an instrument to exploit the
weaker party to the agreement.211
By the first years of the 20th century, form contracts with consumers were common in some industries. The courts quickly distinguished a form contract from the more traditional agreement in
which terms were individually negotiated.212 More importantly,
form contracts were early recognized as not only different, but it
was acknowledged that their interpretation and application required different standards than those traditionally applied to fully
negotiated contracts. This sensitivity is reflected in one court's response to a seller's argument that a disputed contract warranty
said nothing about fitness for threshing grain even though the subject of the sale was a threshing machine: "The contract is upon a
form for general use in the sale of any and all kinds of machinery.
From anything stated in the contract itself the machine sold in
this instance might have been designed to do the work of drilling
oil wells, sawing wood or separating cream."213
When a "form contract had been used there was often a special
interest in whether the disputed term was in "bold type." 214 Some
decisions simply stated that when the seller's form had defined the
limits of the bargain, it must be strictly construed against the
seller.215
These early courts had a clear grasp of the realities of typical
form pad transactions between a commercial seller and a contract, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 630-32 (1971).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 237, Comment a (Tent. Draft 1970).
211. See Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts-An Introduction, 24 WAYNE L. REv.
1307, 131,7 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 237, Comment f (Tent. Draft
1970).
212. Compare the warranty language reproduced by the court in Lindsay v. Fricke,
130 Wis. 107, 109 N.W. 945 (1906), with the warranty provision reprinted in Peter v. Plano
Mfg. Co., 21 S.D. 198, 110 N.W. 783 (1907). Form contracts were Blso used in transactions
between manufacturers and their retail dealers. See, e.g., Miller Rubber Co. v. Blewster
Stevens Serv. Stations, 171 Ark. 1179, 287 S.W. 577 (1926).
213. Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Maxon, 76 Kan. 607, 607, 92 P. 545, 545 (1907).
214. See Parsons Band Cutter & Self-Feeder Co. v. Gadeke, 1 Neb. 605, 95 N.W. 850
(1901).
215. See Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Tate, 70 Colo. 67, 70, 197 P. 764, 765 (1921);
Hansmann v. Pollard, 113 Minn. 429,432, 126 N.W. 848, 850 (1911); Parsons Band Cutter &
Self-Feeder Co. v. Gadeke, 1 Neb. 605, 95 N.W. 850 (1901).
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sumer.216 In none of these opinions, however, did the courts directly address the relative inability of the buyer to negotiate the
removal of a restricted warranty or disclaimer provision. Little, if
any, language betrayed a sympathy for the inability of the average
Kansas farmer to negotiate better warranty terms as part of the
purchase of a new thresher from the McCormick Harvester Company in illinois. Although none of the opinions individually yielded
evigence of an early explicit recognition of the special status of the
consumer, the cumulative evidence suggests that by a variety of
means, many American jurisdictions prior to 1930 consistently interpreted restrictive warranty and disclaimer clauses in a manner
that gave consumers notably more protection than commerical sellers had intended.

Judicial Response to Public Policy Arguments
Direct attacks against disclaimers and restrictive warranties
on public policy grounds were rarely made 217 before the mid1920's.218 Furthermore, the public policy invoked by buyers was
not always clear or consistent. In some cases the buyer did not directly attack the seller's superior bargaining position. The policy
216. The fact that a court noted the disputed disclaimer of warranty provision was part
of a form contract, however, did not always translate into a victory for the buyer. See, e.g.,
Troendly v. J.I. Case Co., 51 Idaho 578, 8 P.2d 276 (1932); Rowe v. Emerson-Brantingham
Implement Co., 61 Mont. 73, 201 P. 316 (1921); Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McClamrock,
152 N.C. 405, 67 S.E. 991 (1910).
217. One early case in which such an attack was made was International Harvester Co.
v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (1914). In Bean the buyer of an "auto wagon" sought
rescission of the contract. The seller contended that it had given a very limited express
warranty and that it had disclaimed all implied warranties. In affirming the judgment for
the buyer, the court stated that unleas such restrictive clauses were fairly made a part of the
contract they would not be enforced. The court continued: "Such a stipulation, relieving, as
it does, the manufacturer from duties imposed by law, will be conclusively presumed to have
been inserted in the contract for the sole benefit of the manufacturer • . . and effect will not
be given to such stipulation unless its inclusion in the contract was fairly procured • . • .
[T]his stipulation was contained in a printed form ..• used by appellant company. The
language of the stipulation is extremely technical • • . its meaning is clear but to few persons • . • . To hold that it was so included would be to give life to the letter of the contract
and render inanimate the spirit thereof." ld. at 845, 169 S.W. at 551. This remarkably
"modern" decision had little impact on later Kentucky decisions with similar facts. See, e.g.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Lea, 198 F.2d 1012, 1015 (6th Cir. 1952).
218. See, e.g., Bridgeport L.A.W. Corp. v. Levy, 110 Conn. 255, 147 A. 841 (1929);
Nemeth v. Becker Roofing Co., 151 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1941); Thare v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 42 N.M. 443, 81 P.2d 703 (1938); Palaniuk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N.D. 199, 220
N.W. 638 (1928); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996
(1926).
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argument asserted did not even address the fundamental lack of a
fully negotiated bargain. Instead, public policy was simply said to
be contrary to the use of fine print terms or obscurely worded warranty disclaimers. 219 Consequently, the "public policy, argument
amounted to little more than a relabeling of the arguments that
had been made with fewer pretentions many years before.220
Therefore, these cases did not represent a real movement towards
confronting modern bargaining reality and the consequent need to
recognize the special status of the consumer.
Some buyers did. argue against the validity of seller-imposed
warranties and disclaimers upon a broader ground. Contending
that the notion of freedom of contract was in need of critical reexamination, they urged the courts to "keep pace . . . with the
march of the times toward a more liberal system of jurisprudence. " 221 The initial judicial response to this broader gauged argument was not favorable. Its rejection by the courts was based on
three conclusions: (1) disclaimers and restricted warranties were
sanctioned by long judicial usage and if these clauses were to be
proscribed, it was a matter for the legislature;222 (2) the buyer in
the case at bar was neither helpless nor unable to take reasonable
steps to protect himself or herself;228 (3) the use of disclaimers was
common in the commercial world and represented a legitimate attempt by contracting parties to allocate the risk of failure of a particular transaction to the buyer.224
Two of the three arguments used by the courts in rejecting the
buyers' demands for the proscription of disclaimers did not address the basic point of the buyers' contentions. In cases where the
court found the buyer capable of self-protection, there was no need
219. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N.W.2d 51 (1975);
Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996 (1926).
220. See notes 208-12 & accompanying text supra.
221. Tharp v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 42 N.M. 443, 450, 81"P.2d 703, 707 (1938).
222. Id. See also Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688, 694 (N.D. 1962).
223. See E.S. Peterson Co. v. Parrott, 129 Me. 381, 383, 152 A. 313, 314 (1930); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 567, 209 N.W. 996, 999 (1926).
224. Nemeth v. Becker Roofing Co., 151 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Mo. 1941). Even in North
Dakota which had adopted legislation that, in effect, precluded the disclaimer of implied
warranties in the sale of farm machinery, the courts were not disposed to move beyond a
restrictive interpretation of the legislative mandate. In Palaniuk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
57 N.D. 199, 205-06, 220 N.W. 638, 639 (1928), the court rejected a buyer's argument that a
clause which denied the right to damage recovery was inconsistent with the spirit of the
North Dakota statute. The court stated that a limited damage clause was a proper exercise
of freedom of contract.
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to reach the substance of the buyer's claim. Similarly, deference to
the legislative prerogative allowed the court to evade consideration
of the merits of a buyer's case. The proposition that disclaimers
served a valid commercial purpose can be considered a direct response to the buyer's argument for the proscription of disclaimers.
Yet even this argument did not really meet the substance of the
buyers' argument because the objection went to the use of disclaimers in a noncommercial context. Invocation of commercial
utility thus begged the question.
"
Not every court rejected the buyers' public policy plea. 2215 Well
into the 1960's, however, buyers won in most cases only because
the courts freely resorted to the oblique interpretative devices
noted earlier.226 The courts' reluctance to confront squarely the
problem of the commercial seller's superior bargaining leverage is
puzzling. Although the courts sometimes were quite frank in expressing their disapproval of inequitable conduct by a commercial
seller,227 they were largely unwilling to employ the most obvious
remedy of drawing a bright line around consumers and extending
special protection to those within that circle. On the other hand,
they did not hesitate to help the buyer if some device could be
employed short of declaring the seller's conduct out of bounds.
The lack of judicial creativity in this area is especially notable considering the great enthusiasm so many courts displayed in dismantling the privity barrier.228 The assault upon privity and disclaimers were impelled by the same exigency: the displacement of
traditional individual buyer-seller relationships by the remote
commercial seller-consumer model. Although in many cases the
courts responded to the privity problem by excising the privity requirement, there was much greater timidity in treating the matter
of disclaimers.
Explanations for the uneven development of the law in the areas of privity and of warranty disclaimers can be only speculative.
Recall, however, that the most dramatic advances in the struggle
against privity occurred after the courts converted breach of war225. See, e.g., Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 1962).
226. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Dugan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C. 1951); Case Credit Corp. v. Andreason, 90 Idaho 12, 408 P.2d 165 (1965); Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301, 310 P.2d 923
(1957); Wade v. Chario Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951); Frigidinners, Inc.
v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
227. See, e.g., Moss v. Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 832, 310 S.W.2d 491, 493 (1958).
228. See notes 95-184 & accompanying text supra.

386

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

ranty into a tort. For unknown reasons, courts did not readily
transfer the warranty-as-tort analysis into the disclaimer cases.229
Had they viewed breach of warranty as a tort in the disclaimer
context, they might have found it easier to accept public policy
arguments aimed at voiding disclaimers. So long as the disclaimer
was viewed purely as a matter of contract law, however, the courts
were faced with the sacred shibboleth of freedom of contract.230
The failure of the courts to extend the warranty-as-tort analysis
beyond the privity context appreciably delayed judicial recognition
of the consumer in disclaimer cases.
A significant change occured with the celebrated case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors. 231 In Henningsen the plaintiff suffered serious physical injury when an automobile manufactured by
Chrysler Corporation and purchased from a local dealer went out
of control. The plaintiff had signed a form sales contract used generally in the automobile industry that included narrowly drawn express warranties. Implied warranties had been completely disclaimed. The court refused to give literal effect both to the
warranty clauses and to the disclaimer provision in the seller's
form, noting that the disputed clauses were not part of a freely
bargained contract but were part of a standardized form "in which
one predominant party will dictate its law to an undetermined
multiple rather than to an individual."232 Th,e court went on to
state:
Although courts, with few exceptions, have been most sensitive to
problems presented by contracts resulting from gross disparity in
buyer-seller bargaining positions, they have not articulated a
general principle condemning, as opposed to public policy, the
imposition on the buyer of a skeleton warranty as a means of
limiting the responsibility of the manufacturer. They have endeavored thus far to avoid a drastic departure from age-old tenets
of freedom of contract by adopting doctrines of strict construction, and notice and knowledgeable assent by the buyer to the
229. There were rare exceptions. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (Traynor, C.J.).
230. The courts have tended to view contract as a "private affair and not a social
institution. The judicial system, therefore, provides only for their interpretation .••. [T]he
courts cannot make contracts for the parties." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943).
231. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
232. Id. at 390, 1~1 A.2d at 85-86.
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attempted exculpation of the seller.233

The Henningsen opinion supplied a general statement,
founded on policy grounds, which permitted courts to examine disclaimers and limited warranty clauses with a new candor. Henningsen thus provided authority for rejecting reliance on conventional interpretative devices in favor of a more direct approach in
dealing with form warranties which were manifestations of unequal
bargaining power. In addition, the Henningsen opinion had a value
independent of its reasoning. The court's unusual outspokenness
seemed to give courage to other courts which had been timid in
their treatment of restrictive warranty and disclaimer provisions.234

Unconscionability
The widespread adoption of the UCC seemed to hasten the
changes Henningsen foreshadowed. 2311 The concept of unconscionability, explicitly recognized by the UCC, became the chief weapon
of the courts in dealing with disclaimer clauses and warranty provisions deemed to be unfair. 238 Reliance on indirect means to police
unfair warranty terms was no longer necessary. 237 Judicial opinions
which have invoked the UCC's concept of unconscionability, when
measured against earlier decisions, reflect a new boldness both in
rhetoric and in reasoning. This new, explicit concern for the consumer manifests itself in a variety of ways. Courts refer directly to
the rights of the average purchaser;238 great care is devoted to ascertaining whether the buyer in a particular case was a "consumer"
or whether the sale took place in a "commercial setting~"239 One
judge has even written that there is "an urgent need to protect the
233. Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87-88 (emphasis added).
234. Not every jurisdiction, however, accepted the rationale or the result in Henningsen. See, e.g., Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688, 694 (N.D. 1962); Harris v.
Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 963, 121 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1961).
235. The Uniform Sales Act gave the parties broad discretion to shape the terms of
their agreement. Its provision treating disclaimers and variations of implied or express obligation by agreement reflected the ideal of freedom of contract. See Uniform Sales Act § 71.
The UCC thus represents an important change in the statutory law.
236. U.C.C. § 2-302. The courts also refer to U.C.C. §§ 2-316, -719(3) in addressing the
legal issues raised by a challenged limited warranty-remedy provision or disclaimer. For a
more detailed treatment of the UCC provisions dealing with disclaimers, see text accompanying notes 267-307 infra.
237. This is consistent with the intent of the drafters of the UCC. See U.C.C. § 2-302,
Comment 1.
238. See Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. App. 1972).
239. Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 66, 544 P.2d 983, 989 (1976).
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heedless seekers of [consumer products] from the few unscrupulous merchants who prey upon them . . . ." 240 Another judge simply refused to enforce a disputed disclaimer provision on the broad
grounds that the unconscionability doctrine rendered void any
contract clause which operates to deprive the buyer of the benefit
of his or her bargain.241 All of these decisions, and others of similar
character,242 assume that the first step in judging the validity of a
challenged clause is to determine whether the buyer may qualify
for consumer status.243
Many courts have enthusiastically seized upon the concept of
unconscionability introduced by the UCC. These courts have given
unconscionability a meaning that justifies the routine use of the
240. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 30 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (1969).
241. Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
242. See, e.g., Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973); Ford Motor
Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 1969); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App.
421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975); Dougall v. Brown Bay Boat Works & Sales, Inc., 287 Minn. 290,
178 N.W.2d 217 (1970); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d
750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973). Some of the sharpest distinctions between consumers and
commercial sellers have been made in cases where the seller was commercial in character.
See Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, 490 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1974); Keystone
Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1974); American Elec.
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Johnson v. Mobil
Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ala. 1975); Jorgenson v. Mark Constr. Co., 56 Hawaii 466, 540
P.2d 978 (1975); Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976);
Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 76 N.C. App. 689, 220 S.E.2d 361 (1975); Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors Co., 80 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
243. The doctrine of unconscionability has attracted an exceptional measure of scholarly attention. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757
(1969); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PriT. L. REv. 1 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITr. L. REV. 359 (1970).
This scholarly interest has produced a number of conflicting views as to what unconscionability means and how the concept may be best employed. For a comparison of the various
approaches, see Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1151,
1164-66 (1976). The courts' use of unconscionability in the disclaimer area evidences a distinct tendency to employ unconscionability as a blunt instrument in aid of results believed
to be appropriate in the case at hand. The courts have, in the main, assumed that in judging
whether a disputed clause is or is not unconscionable, an inquiry into the status of the
contracting parties is wholly appropriate. This assumption has been almost universal despite persuasive commentary which suggests that it may not be justified. See Schwartz,
Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367 (1974). The
drafters of the UCC themselves suggest that unconscionability should not be used to disturb
"allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. The
absence of judicial opinions in the warranty disclaimer area that reflect much sensitivity to
the scholarly gloss on the unconscionability doctrine is not hard to explain. The UCC's explicit recognition of unconscionability has served to release and channel an accumulated
judicial frustration that the perceived inadequacy of prior law had caused. The uncommonly
strong language of the Henningsen opinion suggests the depth of that frustration.
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commercial buyer-consumer test in judging the validity of limited
warranty or disclaimer clauses. There is substantial doubt, however, whether this use of unconscionability in the disclaimer field is
supported by relevant sections of the vee.244 Nonetheless, the undeniable effect of what may be fairly called interpretative abuse
has been to achieve a widespread recognition of the special status
of the consumer in disclaimer cases. Whether that recognition is
justified or not, many courts are deciding cases in conformity with
such reasoning.

Warranties and The Uniform Commercial Code
This Article has examined at length the evolution of judicial
sensitivity to the special status of the consumer in warranty transactions. In recent years, the vee has become the dominant statutory influence in shaping the law of sales warranties. The character
of the vee's warranty provisions must be understood in order to
assay the continued relevance, if any, of prior judicial decisions
that favored the consumer. Moreover, to evaluate fairly the argued
need for the Magnuson-Moss Act, something must be known of the
statutory regime it was intended to reform.
The vee recognizes the two traditional categories of warranty: express and implied.24G An express warranty is defined as
"any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain . . . ." 246 Although no specific intent is required by the
vee to make an express warranty,247 not every statement made
during the course of a sales transaction amounts to an express warranty. An affirmation of fact relating to the goods must be distinguished from a mere commendation of the goods, a puff. This distinction has bedeviled judges, lawyers, and law students alike. 248
To meet the requirements of an express warranty under the
vee, an affirmation of fact must become a part of the basis for the
bargain. This has led some courts to conclude that the vee, like
244. See note 243 supra.
245. This Article will not discuss warranties of title (U.C.C. § 2-312) because such
warranties are of relatively little significance in consumer transactions.
246.
§ 2-313.
247. Id. § 2-313, Comment 3.
248. J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, HANDBooK oF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 328-32 (2d ed. 1980).
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its predecessor act,249 requires that the buyer rely upon the seller,s
affirmation. The UCC,s drafters disavow any intention to require
reliance by the buyer. They provide little guidance, however, as to
what precisely was intended by the phrase· "basis of the
bargain. ,,2150
Despite the problems of language and interpretation just
noted, the UCC does require that the seller deliver goods of the
agreed quality. 2151 Moreover, once given, the seller is without power
to negate an express warranty; disclaimers of express warranties
are not permitted.2152
The implied warranties of merchantability2153 and fitness for a
particular purpose2114 are frequently of greater benefit to the buyer
than express warranties. Express warranties can be narrowly
drawn with a view to affording the seller maximum protection.21515
In contrast, the quality standard imposed upon a seller under implied warranties is not as easily manipulated because the UCC itself supplies their content. The function of the implied warranty of
merchantability, for example, "has been to give legal effect to
buyer,s reasonable expectations based on trade understanding of
the quality of goods normally supplied under such a contract/'2158
The implied warranty of merchantability thus assures that the
goods may be used for their intended purpose.
The UCC provides a full complement of potential remedies for
breach of warranty. These remedies are of two types: goods-ori249. "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." Uniform Sales Act § 12.
250. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. Precisely what the drafters intended by the
phrase "basis of the bargain" has caused considerable uncertainty and has been the subject
of much scholarly writing. See, e.g., Note, "Basis of the Bargain"-What Role Reliance, 34
U. PrrT. L. REV. 145 (1972). Courts also are divided as to the·proper meaning of the phrase.
Some decisions see the phrase as a continuation of the reliance standard in the Uniform
Sales Act. See, e.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d
770 (3d Cir. 1978); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
251. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4.
252. Id. § 2-316(1).
253. Id. § 2-314.
254. Id. § 2-315.
255. See, e.g., Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Whittington v. Eli Lily & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
256. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 398 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 N.Y. LAw REVISION
COMM'N].
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ented and money damages. The buyer's goods-oriented remedies
consist of the right to reject goods that fail in any respect to conform to the contract2 G7 or to revoke acceptance of defective goods,
which, after the period for rejection has passed, prove to be substantially nonconforming. 2 G8 In the case of rejected goods, the seller
retains a limited right to cure by making a conforming tender; 2 G9
ordinarily the buyer should have no reason to object to the seller's
prompt redelivery of conforming goods.
The consumer's goods-oriented remedies under the UCC are
potentially powerful weapons. Undoubtedly, however, few have the
knowledge260 or the confidence to act as quickly as required to preserve these remedies. For the buyer who has accepted and retained
nonconforming goods, the UCC provides remedies designed to
compensate for lost expectancy.261 Section 2-714(2) allows· the
buyer to recover the difference between the value of goods accepted and the value they would have had if the goods had been as
warranted. 262 Damages recovered under this provision of the UCC
257. u.c.c. § 2-601.
258. Id. § 2-608.
259. Id. § 2-508.
260. There is a developing school of thought which argues that many of the problems
faced by consumers can be solved inexpensively by adopting a regulatory scheme that requires sellers to provide maximum information about product quality and consumers' rights
to the buyer. Thus armed, the consumer will make rationale choices which will enhance
economic efficiency and eliminate the need for further governmental regulation of consumer
transactions. See, e.g., Rhoades, Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and Its Effect, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (1975); Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer
Information and Warranty Regulation, 51 IND. L.J. 397 (1976). Some empirical studies suggest, however, that full disclosure does not necessarily influence consumer behavior, because,
among other things, modem advertising techniques create a desire for goods which impels
purchase without much regard for the character of the information provided at the time of
sale. See Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 Wrs. L. REv. 1006, 1097. See generally Davis, Protecting Consumers from
Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of ConsumerCredit Controls, 63 VA. L. REv. 841 (1977). But see Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 630 (1979).
261. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) states: "The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administrated to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed ...•"
262. Although the damage formula provided in § 2-714(2) is easily stated, its application has frequently presented difficulties. Such difficulties have resulted because of the
UCC's failure to identify the variables to be used in the formula. Courts are thus left to
decide what measure of damage is appropriate in a particular case. The results are not always consistent. Compare Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973), with American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F.
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have been called "primary"263 damages. Yet the buyer's loss may
exceed the compensation to which he or she is entitled under section 2-714. Recognizing this, the drafters provided sections 2714(3) and 2-715 to allow recovery of "resultant" damages.264 Resultant damages include property damage, personal injury, and
general reliance expenditures. Recovery of resultant damages, however, depends upon the buyer's effort to limit such losses by taking
economically reasonable actions after discovery of the breach of
warranty. 265
If the warranty and remedy sections surveyed above constituted the whole of the UCC insofar as it pertains to a buyer's
rights, the buyer would be well protected. Section 2-316, however,
allows a seller to disclaim implied warranties, and section 2-719
permits a seller to limit a buyer's remedies for breach of warranty.266 Although the UCC restricts the seller's power to disclaim
warranties or to limit remedies, a well-advised seller is frequently
able to gain a distinct advantage over the buyer despite the drafters' clear intent to limit the seller's freedom of contract.267
Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
263. Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CoRNELL L. REV. 30, 106 (1978).
264. Id.
265. The drafters of the UCC intended to impose the obligation to limit damages or
lose the right to recover resultant losses on the aggrieved party: See U.C.C. § 1-106, Comment 1.
266. The UCC provides other protective clauses for the seller. They are not, however,
the kinds of provisions that can be exploited by a contracting party with superior bargaining
power. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (requires the buyer to give notice of breach within a
reasonable time or be barred from any remedy); id. § 2-725(1) (imposes a four-year statute
of limitations on actions for breach of warranty). These provisions and others like them
require the consumer to act reasonably to protect his or her rights.
267. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) does not permit the seller to limit or negate express warranties
to the extent that such a construction of the contract is unreasonable. U.C.C. § 2-316(2)
imposes certain conditions on the seller's right to disclaim implied warranties. While it is
not difficult to draft form contract provisions which meet the literal requirement of U.C.C. §
2-316(2), in an effort to protect consumers, courts have made compliance with § 2-316(2)
difficult. See text accompanying note 268 infra. U.C.C. § 2-719 limits the seller's power to
restrict buyer remedies; the stipulated remedy is optional unless the agreement expressly
provides otherwise; limitations on consequential damages for personal injury are prima facie
unconscionable and limitations on consequential damages of any kind may be unconscionable in consumer transactions. Id. § 2-719(3). Finally, when circumstances cause an exclusive
or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, the aggrieved buyer may take advantage of
all other Code remedies. Recent commentary suggests that the phrase "failure of essential
purpose" has a more limited meaning than had been assumed. See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purpose of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF.
L. REv. 28 (1977). Professor Eddy contends that too many courts have used§ 2-719(2) as a
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The typical consumer contract contains a familiar battery of
clauses aimed at reducing to a minimum the seller's liability for
breach. 26s These exculpatory clauses frequently appear as part of
an impressive document ornately decorated and bearing the promi~
nent legend "Guarantee" or "Warranty.'., While the consumer may
believe that he or she is protected in the event the goods prove
defective, what the consumer actually has received is a contract
carefully drafted to minimize the buyer's rights and to maximize
the seller's protection against liability.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the UCC's treatment of
warranty principles. First, if unaltered by specific contractual pro~
visions, the UCC provides reasonable protections for the buyer's
expectations as to the quality of contract goods. Second, the con~
tracting parties are free to limit these protections by agreement.
The UCC thus is founded on the principle of freedom of con~
tract. 269 While this freedom is not absolute, 270 it is considerable. In
transactions between parties with equal power to bargain over war~
ranty terms, freedom of contract may be salutary. In the typical
consumer contract where the consumer retains little power to bargain over the warranty terms, however, freedom of contract can be
dictatorial.271
The law of sales, of which article 2 of the UCC is but the most
license to indulge in judicial moralism at the sellers' expense.
268. The following clauses regularly appear in the typical sales contract: (1) an express warranty against defects in the goods, usually limited to materials and workmanship;
(2) a limitation of buyer's remedy to repair or replacement of defective goods or parts; (3) a
clause excluding all other express or implied warranties; (4) a provision insulating the seller
from liability for consequential damages; (5) a clause limiting the seller's liability based on
the purchase price of the goods. Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 VA. L. REv. 791, 793 (1977). Typical warranty
provisions in consumer sales contracts are treated in Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1972); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 226 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. 1977);
Recreative, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wis. 2d 255, 226 N.W.2d 474 (1975).
269. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 2.
270. Some of the UCC's limitations upon the freedom to contract have already been
discussed. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719(3). The principal UCC section that operates to limit
freedom of contract is § 2-302, which allows a court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable
contract or term. Attempts to define "unconscionability" have produced a plethora of scholarly work including Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1041 (1976). Professor Dawson's thoughtful article assesses the idea of unconscionability in German law and then applies it to the American system.
271. See Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 1006, 1095-98; S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8
(1973).
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recent embodiment, developed to supply the needs of those with a
substantial and continuing economic stake in the operation of contractual agreements.272 Although the drafters of the UCC attempted to distinguish nonmerchants from merchants in drafting
the rules governing contracts,278 the same warranty restrictions are
applicable to both.27"
A major objective of this Article has been to suggest that there
exists an important body of judicial decisions which substantially
supplements statutory schemes designed to regulate sales warranties. This judicial tradition predates the UCC; indeed, in its origins, it predates Professor Williston's Uniform Sales Act. This ·
body of judicial law, which has grown almost irresistibly in influence and complexity, has created a wealth of decisions which have
served effectively to protect consumer interests.271i The willingness
of many courts to adapt principles of commercial law to shield the
consumer from exploitation in the marketplace prior to the enactment of the UCC demonstrates that the law of sales warranties
must not be seen as requiring only mastery of selected sections of
the UCC. Rather, the UCC should be viewed in the context of the
broader proconsumer judicial tradition that continues to exert a
subtle but persistent influence upon courts which must interpret
UCC warranty provisions. The UCC itself strikes a somewhat ambiguous balance between the importance of consumer protection
and the perceived . need to facilitate the conduct of commercial
272. Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 590 (1969). The typical
merchant's contracts are frequently a part of continuing business relationships. The long
term character of commercial agreements imposes special demands upon conventional contract law. See generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691
(1974). See also Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 622-23 (1975). Professor Llewellyn, the chief drafter of article 2,
was a leader in the realist school of jurisprudence. As Professor Danzig notes, the primary
argument of those attacking the realists was that the realists conceived of law "as a body of
devices for the purposes of business instead of a body of means toward general social ends."
Id. at 627-28 (quoting Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv. 697
(1931)).
· 273. The UCC defines merchant in§ 2-104(1). Sections in which the merchant-nonmerchant distinction is relevant include §§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-403(2), and 2-609(2). Determining who is a merchant is not always easy. Compare Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala.
722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975), with Sierens v. Clausen, 60 ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975).
274. Only a merchant-seller can give an implied warranty of merchantability. See
J].C.C. § 2-314(1). But see id. § 2-314, Comment 4. The UCC warranty sections do not
utilize the merchant-nonmercbant dichotomy to protect the consumer who is victimized by
the commerical seller's superior bargaining power.
275. See notes 191-92 & accompanying text supra.
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transactions. It is precisely this ambiguity which suggests that the
pre-UCC judicial tradition of sensitivity to consumer needs will
continue to play a meaningful role in the evolution of warranty law
in the years ahead.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: The Argument
For Reform
In the 1950's, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) began receiving numerous complaints about defective consumer products from purchasers who had received warranties
which, in the consumer's view, were insufficient.276 Beginning in
1962, successive Presidents delivered messages to Congress addressing the need for federal regulation of automobile warranty
practices. In 1967, legislation was introduced to strengthen consumer warranties.1177 President Johnson appointed a special task
force to study warranty practices in the appliance industry in
1969.278 By 1970, results of the FTC field study on automobile warranties and the presidential task force on the appliance industry
suggested that there was a need for federal legislation imposing
substantive and procedural warranty standards on the manufacturers of consumer goods.279 In 1975, after a number of failed attempts, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act280
(Act).
A detailed analysis of the Act would be superfluous in light of
the wealth of scholarly publications on the subject.281 A brief overview of the Act's major provisions is justified, however, in light of
its impact on warranty law. Some attention will also be given to
criticisms of the Act that have emerged since its enactment.
276. C. REITZ, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-Moss WARRANTY Ac:r 11
(1978) [hereinafter cited as REITZ].
277. Magnuson, Fair Disclosure in the Market Place of Warranty Promises-Truth
in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117, 119 (1975).
278. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 7705, 7707.
279. For a general discussion of the events preceding the adoption of the MagnusonMoss Act, see Magnuson, Fair Disclosure in the Market Place of Warranty
Promises-Truth in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117, 118-22 (1975).
280. 15
§§ 2301-2312 (1976 & Supp.
1979).
281. Among the many studies of the Magnuson-Moss Act perhaps the most useful are:
REITZ, supra note 276; Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product
Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REv. 835 (1977); Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act:
Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer Interests?, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 335 (1976).
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The Act does not apply to oral warranties,282 and does not impose a written warranty requirement on any seller. If a seller does
give a written warranty within the meaning of the Act, then that
written warranty must meet certain statutory standards.
The Act's definition of a written warranty is highly technical
and does not correspond precisely with the definition of express
warranty in the UCC.288 For a written warranty to arise under the
Act, the seller must assert that the goods are free from defects or
will meet "a specified level of performance over a specified period
of time. ''2B' Consequently, energy ratings on electrical appliances,
for example, may be express warranties under the DCC, but do not
constitute written warranties under the Act because a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time can not be inferred from such a rating.2815
A written warranty within the meaning of the Act must be labeled "full" or "limited."286 A full warranty must provide the purchaser certain remedies in the event of breach,287 but it need not
extend any parl;icular qualitative assurances about the product.288
The duration of implied warranties may not be limited,289 and any
exclusion or limitation of consequential damages must be conspicuous.290 Finally, the seller who extends a full warranty must allow
the buyer to elect a refund or replacement of the goods after a
282. The Senate version of the Act attempted to extend its reach to oral warranties by
allowing a plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees in cases where a breach of an express oral
warranty had been proven. The House version which was ultimately adopted did not include
a parallel provision. S. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. NEws 7755, 7758.
283. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. ill 1979) ("The term 'written
warranty' means any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with
the sale of a consumer product by a supplier • • . which relates to the nature of the material
or provides workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a
specified period of time •••") with U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) ("Express warranties by the seller
are created as follows: Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise").
284. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. ill 1979) (emphasis added).
285. See 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a) (1979).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1976).
287. Id. § 2304(a)(l).
288. There are some commentators who argue that the term "full warranty" is deceptive. See Consumer Warranty Protection-1973: Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate Commerce,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 92-93 (1973) (statement of Professor Fairfax Leary, Jr.).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976).
290. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
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reasonable number of unsuccessful attempts to repair. 291 A limited
warranty is any written warranty that does not qualify as a full
warranty. 292
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act authorizes the FTC to
promulgate rules and regulations governing the character and timing of disclosure of warranty information.298 The Commission has
drafted regulations that require sellers to disclose in clear, conspicuous, and simple language certain essential information on consumer products costing more than fifteen dollars. 294 In addition,
the Commission's interpretation of the Act requires the seller to
disclose warranty terms prior to sale.295 The regulations also impose presale disclosure requirements on catalog or mail order sellers296 and on sellers who utilize door to door salespersons.297 The
retail in-store seller may make such disclosures in a variety of
ways.
Advocates of the Act argued that the availability of adequate
warranty information prior to sale would produce rational consumer behavior; consumers equipped with adequate warranty information prior to sale would make choices in the marketplace that
would encourage competition among sellers to provide better warranties. In order to make the cost of these better warranties tolerable, the argument continues, manufacturers will produce higher
quality products.298 Skeptics of this reasoning argued that if written warranties were not required, many sellers would elect to escape the burden of compliance with the Act by giving no warran291. Id. § 2304(a)(4).
292. A limited warranty is not defined by the Act. The seller who undertakes to give a
limited warranty is legally free to fashion the character of the warranty obligation he or she
assumes. It is quite possible that a limited warranty may be more useful to a consumer than
a full warranty. REITz, supra note 276, at 60.
293. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)-(b) (1976).
294. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1980). Matters subject to mandatory disclosure include: (1)
persons to whom protection of the warranty is extended; (2) a description of the product or
parts thereof which the warranty covers; (3) a statement of what the seller will do in the
event of product malfunctions; (4) the time at which warranty protection commences; (5) a
description of what the consumer should do to obtain warranty service; (6) information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement mechanisms; (7) any limitation
on the duration of implied warranties or the exclusion or limitation of,::£onsequential damages; (8) a notation that limitations or exclusions of implied warranties or damages may not
be enforceable under state law. Id.
295. Id. § 702.3(a)(1).
296. Id. § 702.3(c).
297. Id. § 702.3(d).
298. 120 CoNG. REc. 40,712 (1974) (statement of Senator Magnuson).
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ties at all. 299 There has been, however, no discernible trend
towards the sale of consumer goods without any warranties.300
Consumer critics have focused on two other asserted deficiencies of the Act. First, the Act seems to countenance the exclusion
or limitation of consequential damages. 301 This is perceived by
some as significantly undermining the benefit to consumers of
other salutary provisions of the Act. 302 Such concern is largely misplaced because the Act does not displace existing consumer rights
under state law.303 Second, consumer advocates fear that many innovative state laws designed to improve warranty standards will be
neutralized by the Magnuson-Moss Act. 304 The Act itself, however,
should be sufficient to preserve prior innovative state rules regulating warranties.3011
299. Many commentators have recognized that the effect of the Act has been principally to protect against warranty deception and not to regulate the substantive content of
the bargain. See, e.g., Schroeder, Private Actions Under the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978).
300. Emerging Issues Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 45 A.B.A. ANTITRusT L.J. 72, 74 (1976) (introductory remarks of J.
Bernstein).
301. Although the Act does not expressly sanction the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, a fair reading of its provisions implies an intent not to prohibit such
exclusions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1976).
302. See Comment, The Federal Consumer Warranty Act and Its Effect on State
Law, 43 TENN. L. REv. 429 (1976).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 23ll(b)(l) (1976). Recall that article 2 of the UCC restricts the right
of sellers to exclude or limit liability for consequential damages in many consumer sales. In
addition, many courts have invoked the UCC's general unconscionability section to police
purported limitations of consequential damages in consumer transactions. See Jacobs v.
Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972); McCarty v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86
Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 29 (1975). But see Billings v. Harris Co., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220
S.E.2d 361 (1975).
304. See Schmitt & Kovac, Magnuson-Moss vs. State Protective Consumer Legislation: The Validity of a Stricter State Standard of Warranty Protection, 30 ARK. L. REv.
21, 25-26 (1976). A number of states had responded to the problem of inadequate consumer
warranties in consumer sales prior to the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
For a survey of state legislation, see Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A
New Dimension in Consumer Protection, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 567, 584-97 (1975).
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 231l(b)(l) (1976). The ubiquitous Professor Leary may be responsible for preserving the full vigor of. prior state consumer protection laws. Testifying
before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, Professor Leary argued that an early
version of the Act which preserved ·only state law remedies was inadequate. He contended
language should be added which preserves substantive rights under state law. The existing
law reflects Professor Leary's recommendation. Consumer Warranty Protection-1973:
Hearings on H.R. 20 and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 93-94 (statement of Professor
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In light of these criticisms, it is suprising that consumer advocates have not exploited the provision in the Act that prohibits a
seller who gives either a full or limited warranty from disclaiming
any implied warranty.308 Although the Act creates no new implied
warranties, its prohibition of disclaimers precludes a seller from escaping liability for a failure of the goods to conform to reasonable
qualitative standards. In this sense, the Act does address the substantive content of warranties.

Conclusion
There has been suprising agreement-even among many of the
Act's critics-on the proposition that federal warranty legislation
is needed. This consensus may be attributed to the compelling-often vivid-empirical evidence of consumer abuse gathered
by the many executive commissions and congressional committees
that examined the realities of the modern marketplace.307 Yet the
existence of consumer exploitation does not suffice as a justification for federal intervention. It must also be shown with equal clarity that existing state law does not provide an adequate basis for
the redress of consumer grievances.
The cases reviewed in this Article demonstrate that, over time,
the courts have been successful in breaking down the privity barrier which stood between the aggrieved consumer and a remote solvent defendant. This result was achieved by resort to a variety of
interpretive devices and doctrinal innovations. The key to the consumer's triumph over the privity barrier, however, was the willingness of courts to view breaches of warranty as actions not completely confined within a contractual context. Once this procedural
obstacle was overcome, the cases reflect a remarkable disposition
to innovate in aid of the consumer. This proconsumer attitude in
warranty-privity actions made a major contribution to the development of the broader field of products liability law. Once the privity
Fairfax Leary, Jr.).
306. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976). Some observers have noted the importance of the
Act's prohibition on disclaiming implied warranties. See, e.g., REITz, supra note 276, at 6364; Roberts, The Magnuson-Moss Federal Wa"anty Act and Failure of Its Essential Purpose, Uniform Commercial Code 2-719(2), 33 Bus. LAw. 1845, 1849 (1978); Comment, The
Federal Consumer Warranty Act and Its Effect on State Law, 43 TENN. L. REv. 429 (1976);
Note, The Magnuson-Moss Wa"anty Act: Consumer Information and Wa"anty Regulation, 51 IND. L.J. 397, 411-12 (1976).
307. See notes 276-79 & accompanying text supra.
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problem was solved, the courts began the process of dismantling
the limitations on damage recoveries in consumer "warranty-products liability" actions. This process is still ongoing.
The courts have forcefully dealt with warranty disclaimers and
remedy limitations which sellers have routinely inserted in the typical form warranty provided to consumers. Judicial approaches to
this particular manifestation of consumer exploitation have varied
greatly over the last century. In earlier years, acting in deference to
the idea of freedom of contract, courts felt constrained to protect
the consumer by the use of oblique interpretative devices which
checked seller overreaching without seeming to abuse then fashionable notions of judicial nonintervention in private bargains. In recent times, the courts have more directly expressed public policy
objections to the enforcement of unreasonable warranty terms. The
advent of unconscionability, given explicit sanction in the UCC,
has been a particularly significant development in the struggle to
deal with continuing manifestations of seller overreaching.
Why, then, the need for the Magnuson-Moss Act? Essentially,
the Act is designed to deal with the more marginal and less fundamental frustrations which consumers have encountered in the
purchase of consumer goods.808 The Act attempts to force sellers to
disclose in understandable language the nature of the warranty
they have given and, in the event the warranty is breached, to ensure that sellers will deal with buyers in an equitable manner.
These are legitimate goals, but there is substantial doubt whether
the Magnuson-Moss Act has been a success even when judged
against its own relatively modest objectives.809 Moreover, whether
the cost of complying with the Act is equal to the benefits it has
conferred upon consumers is by no means clear.810
Careful analysis reveals that much state case law prior to the
adoption of the Act was sensitive to and supportive of the special
needs of the consumer. Moreover, the clear trend, of state law in
308. It is not intended to suggest that the concerns addressed by the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act are unimportant or irrelevant. The Act's aim is to deal with "contracts of
frustration" in the sense intended by Professor Mueller. See generally Mueller, Contracts of
Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576 (1969).
309. See Note, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN.
L. REv. 1117 (1979). The author struggles to conclude that the Act has been at least modestly successful. I d. at 1145-46. The empirical evidence gathered, however, makes it difficult
to argue that the Act has been a success in terms of achieving its objectives.
310. See generally Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979).
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the sales warranty field has been to broaden the rights of the consumer at the expense of the commercial buyer. The existence of
this significant body of state law deserved more serious attention
than it received from those who argued that the need for federal
legislation was overwhelming.311 The significant and enduring impact of the common law as a device for consumer protection in
warranty transactions must be considered in the continued evaluation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

311. The Act's sponsors have tended to dismiss state law as a body of rules whose
"essence lies buried in a myriad of reported legal decisions and in complicated state codes of
commercial law." Magnuson, Fair Disclosure in the Market Place of Warranty
Promises-Truth in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117 (1975). To criticize state
law because it is "complicated," however, is hardly an argument that it is inadequate to
protect the consumer. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act itself could not be described as a
model of simplicity.

